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on strategic environments. We find that environments with strategic complementarity
or substitutability lead to different long-run norms and horizontal socializations. When
players face many games within the same class, under complementarity agents converge
to the same norm and socialization is high, under substitutability norms may diverge or
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From any given set of rules of conduct of the element will arise a steady
structure (showing ‘homeostatic’ control) only in an environment in which there
prevails a certain probability of encountering the sort of circumstances to which
the rules of conduct are adapted. A change of environment may require, if the
whole is to persist, a change in the order of the group and therefore in the
rules of conduct of the individuals; and a spontaneous change of the rules of
individual conduct and of the resulting order may enable the group to persist
in circumstances which, without such change, would have led to its destruc-
tion.[Hayek 1967: 71]
1 Introduction
In our societies some norms or cultural traits, for example languages, appear to be more
homogeneous than others, like attitudes toward conflict or effort choices at the workplace.
This might be due to the fact that material incentives to coordinate are, often, stronger in
the former strategic environment than in the latter. In fact, in linguistic interactions there
are evident material incentives to coordinate on the same language, while in competitive
interactions for scarce shared resources, the material incentives are to anti-coordinate.
Nevertheless, cultural heterogeneity is ubiquitous in many societies even when there are
strong incentives to coordinate. For example, we observe separated minorities who fail
to use incumbents’ languages and the resilience of the native languages in integrated
second-generation immigrants.1
The aim of the paper is to propose a model of the interplay between norms and strategic
decisions that allows to study the evolution of norms depending on the underlying strategic
environment, and to explore its properties for policy purposes. The final objective is to
obtain different social outcomes, such as convergence toward the same social norm, the
persistence of norms’ heterogeneity, or even polarization of norms, while using the same
norm formation model and depending on the strategic environment agents are exposed
to during their adult life. In particular, we consider environments where actions are
strategic complements, so that agents have clear material incentives to coordinate, and
environments where actions are strategic substitutes, so that agents have clear material
incentives to anti-coordinate.2 We explore the effect of the strategic environment on
norms’ evolution along two dimensions. On the one hand, we consider the effect of two
strategic classes, complements or substitutes environments. On the other hand, we study
1Bisin and Verdier (2011) offers a review of empirical examples of cultural heterogeneity and resilience of
cultural traits. For example, the slow rate of immigrants’ integration in Europe and US, the persistence of
’ethnic capital’ in second- and third-generation immigrants, minorities’ strong attachment to languages and
cultural traits.
2There exist strategic environments, like the prisoner’s dilemma, who do not belong to either class. Our
model can be applied also to these cases but it is beyond the scope of this paper.
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both situations in which agents play several games with payoffs distributed within the
same strategic class, and also environments in which they always play the same game.
The model should help to investigate whether strategic complements (arising for example
in communication problems) necessarily lead to assimilation of norms or, instead, leave
space to a multicultural society or even to the arising of an oppositional culture with the
consequent separation of the minority. Relatedly, we shall use the model to investigate
whether in environments with strategic substitutability, being more “competitive”, norms
are doomed not to be homogeneous (leading for example to different attitudes toward
conflict). Moreover, we wonder if there exist socio-economic environments where material
incentives make norms neutral in the long run. Understanding the relationship between
the strategic environment and the emergence of different cultural traits may help to better
address policy issues.
In our model the population is divided into two groups or communities. Agents be-
longing to the same community are endowed with the same cultural trait or personal
norm. Norms can be viewed as “mental representations of appropriate behavior” (Aarts
and Dijksterhuis, 2003) or “internal standard of conduct” (Schwartz, 1977), namely they
represent preferences over actions.3 Agents interact twice during their lives. First, while
young, each agent forms a new norm taking into account both family pressure (verti-
cal socialization) and peer pressure (horizontal socialization).4 The latter represents the
willingness to conform to peers. Then, in the adult age, agents are randomly matched to
play symmetric 2 × 2 games where, by shaping agents’ preferences, different norms lead
to different strategic outcomes (as in Akerlof, 1976; Young, 1998). Norms parametrize
agent preferences over material payoffs and thus best reply actions and Nash equilibria
depend both on a material component and on an immaterial one. The material compo-
nent pushes toward coordination or anti-coordination depending on the ordering of two
material forces that define the game class. The immaterial component can be neutral
(no effect) or enhance payoffs received by playing either action. The tension between the
material and immaterial forces determines ultimate payoffs and thus Nash Equilibria. In
turn, actions most played in equilibrium modify each group norm and socialization level,
thus different socio-economic environments can have an effect on the selection of norms
as suggested by Hayek (1967). At the end of their lives (old age), each agent transmits a
norm and a socialization parameter to her offsprings and the whole process repeats again.
Notably, in this model agents are active in all the stages of their life (youth, adult age,
and old age) and each stage can be analyzed separately.
In Section 2.1, we analyze the norm formation mechanism of the youth age. Children
are not passive during the transmission process and they are responsible for the formation
3This definition of norms differs from the one used in the evolutionary game theory literature (Kandori, 1992;
Young, 1993, for example) where a norm is broadly defined as a specific equilibrium of a strategic interaction.
4We refer to Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981); Bisin and Verdier (2001) for the terminology.
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of their own norms. We follow Kuran and Sandholm (2008) and assume that, in choosing
the norm, each agent faces a trade-off between her inherited norm and a social coordination
payoff, minimizing a loss function. The socialization parameter, which determines the
weight put on the entire population average norm (horizontal socialization) as opposed
to the weight put on the inherited norm (vertical socialization) describes the strength of
such trade-off. With respect to the previous literature, we introduce heterogeneity in the
socialization parameter of each community, an endogenous variable of our model.
In Section 2.2, we model the effect of norms on different strategic environments. We
interpret each agent’s norm as the preference for playing a particular action, thus modi-
fying the payoff associated with playing according to it. The intuition is that the less an
action is in line with the personal norm of the agent, the lower is the psychological utility
derived from its associated material outcome. Each strategic environment is a symmetric
2 × 2 game, which is meant to be representative of tasks that people can face in their
adult age. For the complements case, a possible example is the choice of which language
to use when there are material incentives associated to coordination and each group norm
represents the preference for using a specific language. For the substitutes case, a pos-
sible example is the choice to “fight or flight” in a competition for a shared resource, so
that the material incentives are to anti-coordinate, and each group norm represents the
attitude toward aggressive behavior.5 In their adult age, agents can face several games
of the same strategic class, described by a distribution of payoffs. Agents are randomly
matched so that each agent strategically interacts with agents belonging to both groups.
We assume a multiplicative interaction between norms and material payoffs. If the norms
are neutral, the payoffs of the game are equivalent to material payoffs and agents play
the original 2 × 2 game. If norms assume extreme values, agents stick to the associated
action, giving no importance to material payoffs. When norms have intermediate values,
there is a trade-off between the material consequence of actions and playing according to
the behavior associated with such norm. Relatedly, we derive the possible Nash equilibria
as depending on the tension between material payoffs and norms over behavior.
In Section 2.3, in order to characterize the feedback between the strategic environment
and norms, we study the transmission of norms from old to young and the evolution of
the socialization parameter. The transmission is moved by cognitive dissonance and
cultural substitution. Cognitive dissonance, firstly proposed by Festinger (1962) and
assumed also in the cultural dynamics model of Kuran and Sandholm (2008), is the ten-
dency of agents to have consistency between behavior (actions) and norms (preferences
over actions) and it is widely documented in social psychology (Cooper and Fazio, 1984;
Baumeister, 1982). Cultural substitution captures the idea that the vertical socialization
5There exist examples of norms that can fit in both complements and substitution environments. Consider
the choice of effort level in team-work: whether the underlying material payoffs exert complementarity or
substitutability depends on the possibility to free-ride on the team-mate’s effort. See also the discussion in
Session 4.
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level of offsprings negatively depends on the diffusion of parents’ behavior in the pop-
ulation (Bisin and Verdier, 2001). The functional form chosen for the evolution of the
socialization parameter is microfounded in Appendix B.
In Section 3, we derive all possible long-run outcomes as depending on both the youth
coordination game and the adult-age strategic environment. We consider two limit cases:
uniform and point distribution of one-stage game material payoffs. In Section 3.1, we
analyze uniform distribution of payoffs and show that environments with complements or
substitutes produce very different norms in the long-run. In a social environment with
complements, cultural assimilation emerges as a stable steady state, i.e. both commu-
nities share the same norm and behavior in the long-run. On the contrary, in a social
environment with substitutes, steady states with assimilation exist but are unstable. Since
agents play a coordination game in their youth, when they face strategic substitutes in
the adult age two opposite forces are at play, thus material incentives may lead both
to the erosion of norms or to the polarization of norms and behavior of agents belong-
ing to different communities. Steady states with norms’ erosion or polarization may be
both locally or globally stable depending on the relative size of cognitive dissonance and
horizontal socialization: a higher cognitive dissonance, with respect to the maximum of
horizontal socialization, corresponds to a wider space for the polarization of norms.
The different strategic environments lead also to different socialization levels. Under
assimilation, agents have a maximum horizontal socialization level, and thus a minimum
vertical socialization. Under polarization, the horizontal socialization level is close to its
minimum and thus vertical socialization is close to its maximum. Interestingly, when
there is polarization of norms, the larger the majority, the farther away are both norms
and socialization levels. Indeed, in order to stick to its preferred behavior (different from
the one of the majority) the smaller the minority is, the higher the vertical socialization
becomes.
Results change in Section 3.2, where we analyze the case of agents playing always the
same game (singular material payoff distribution). Depending on the initial norms, in
both complements and substitutes environments, there exist material payoffs such that
the society may converge toward norm assimilation or diverge to polarization. Moreover,
we show that partial convergence or partial polarization can be sustained in games with
strategic complements and substitutes, respectively. In these cases, one community has a
norm so strong as to generate a dominant strategy while the other does not have such a
strong norm and best replies to the dominant strategy as influenced mostly by material
payoffs.
In Section 4, we discuss the model outcomes under general payoff distributions, the
role of assortativity on the matching process for the speed of convergence, and possi-
ble further development of the model allowing for mixed (complements and substitutes)
environments. Section 5 concludes the paper.
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1.1 Literature Review
In recent years, a very wide literature about norms and their effect in socio-economic
outcomes has emerged. Many works focus on the relationship between norms (or culture)
and coordination. Acemoglu and Jackson (2014) study the evolution of a cooperation
norm; Dalmazzo et al. (2014) present conditions under which harmful cultural traits can
persist in a community; Michaeli and Spiro (2017) address the arising of biased norm when
agents, with pressure to conform to each other, play a coordination game; Carvalho (2016)
shows how cultural constraints can lead to miscoordination. In Tabellini (2008) agents
who are matched together to play a Prisoner Dilemma face a trade-off between individual
values (inherited from parents) and material incentives. The main contribution of our
work with respect to these papers is that we study the outcome for different classes of
games at once and let the norm formation process depend both on the imitation of peers
(horizontal socialization) and the transmission of parents (vertical socialization).
The literature about cultural transmission was initiated by Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman
(1981) and, in economics, by Bisin and Verdier (2001), where the evolution of cultural
traits is the result of parent’s socialization choices. Socialization can be vertical (parents),
horizontal (peers), and oblique (role models). Along these lines, Bisin and Verdier (2017)
study the joint evolution of culture and institutions. In our paper, the socialization is
vertical, when parents transmit their preferences to offsprings, and horizontal, when peers
interact together to form new norms. In our model the transmitted cultural traits are
continuous, as in Panebianco (2014). For a complete theoretical and empirical survey on
cultural transmission literature see Bisin and Verdier (2011).
For what concern the effect of norms on the payoff structure, this paper refers to a
specific behavioral literature (Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2008; Kessler and Leider, 2012; Kimbrough
and Vostroknutov, 2016) where actions depends on the will to adhere to a norm.6 The
main difference is that in our paper agents are affected by a group-specific norm, not
necessarily equal for the whole society, so that different players can be subject to different
norms.
The concept of cognitive dissonance we use for the dynamics of preferences was in-
troduced in economics by Akerlof and Dickens (1982). Kuran and Sandholm (2008) and
Calabuig et al. (2016, 2017, 2018), whose norm formation and norm dynamics are close to
ours, have also elements of cognitive dissonance in the updating of norms. In particular,
our contribution can be seen as an extension of Kuran and Sandholm (2008) where agents,
endowed with their norms, interact in strategic environments, and where the dynamics
of norms depends on the interaction between norms and the related equilibrium outcome
of games. If we switch-off feedbacks of equilibrium actions on transmitted norms and
horizontal socializations, our model boils down to a discrete time version of Kuran and
6An alternative viewpoint is that norms imply preferences for a certain distribution of outcomes, i.e. uniform
across players.
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Sandholm (2008). Having these feedbacks changes the results drastically, for example we
are able to reproduce cultural heterogeneity even with fixed communities and complete
interaction.
Our model talks also to the literature of identities and oppositional cultures pioneered
in economics by Akerlof and Kranton (2000). Kuran and Sandholm (2008) study the
tension between cultural integration and multiculturalism, Bisin et al. (2011) focus on the
reason that leads to the presence of oppositional cultures, Olcina et al. (2017) address
the problem of minorities embedded in a relationships network who decide whether or
not to be assimilated to the majority norm. Our main contribution with respect to this
literature is to make explicit the effect of different strategic environments.
The literature about indirect evolution (see for example Gu¨th and Yaari, 1992; Gu¨th
and Kliemt, 1994; Bester and Gu¨th, 1998; Guttman, 2000) studies environments in which
evolutionary selection acts indirectly on preferences. Our approach, even if close in the
spirit, is more strongly related to Bisin et al. (2004), where the evolution of preferences
is moved by a purely cultural transmission mechanism.
Finally, our model can be applied even in the framework of opinion dynamics (De-
Groot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010, 2012) where there is the
tension between reaching consensus and disagreement. For example, Yildiz et al. (2013)
find in the presence of stubborn agents the reasons of disagreement, Golub and Jackson
(2010) study the general conditions for reaching the consensus in a network, and Bolletta
and Pin (2019) show how an endogenous network structure can lead to opinion’s polar-
ization. In this framework, according to our model, agents form their opinion taking into
account both their previous opinion and the one of others. Then, when they are supposed
to take decisions, they are affected by both opinions and material rewards. Thus, they
update and transmit new opinions taking into account also the experience gained through
interaction. The main insight of our work with respect to this literature is that the inter-
play between material incentives and opinions may be crucial for leading to a consensus
or to disagreement.
2 The Model
In this section, we introduce our model for the interplay between norms and strategic
interaction. We begin with a general overview.
Consider a society of mass 1 with infinitesimal agents divided into two communities
I = {1, 2}. Without loss of generality, define η ∈ [12 , 1) the size of community 1, the
majority. Agents belonging to the same community are assumed to be equal and i ∈ I is
the representative agent of each community.
Each time period t ∈ N ∪ {0} indexes a generation of agents. We divide a generation
into three different sub-periods. In Stage (y), youth, the social coordination game that
7
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3407246 
microfounds the choice of personal norms takes place; in Stage (a), adult age, agents
interact by playing games whose payoffs are determined also by personal norms; in Stage
(o), old age, norms and socialization levels are transmitted to the next generation.
Stage (y) When young, members of the two communities are endowed with type-
specific observable personal norms θt = (θ1,t, θ2,t) ∈ [0, 1]2 and socialization levels ft =
(f1,t, f2,t) ∈ [0, f¯ ]2, where f¯ ∈ (0, 1) is a parameter that represents the maximal level of
horizontal socialization. Both characteristics are inherited by the previous generation.
Playing a social coordination game, young agents symmetrically choose ex-post personal
norms xt = (x1,t, x2,t) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Stage (a) During their adult age, agents interact in a strategic environment. Agents
are randomly matched in pairs to play several symmetric 2 × 2 games. Different games
are available in the same period and each game is played according to a probability
distribution γ. Each agent plays with members of both communities, namely a fraction
η of times against the majority and a fraction 1 − η against the minority. Games and
population matches are drawn from independent distributions. Norms influence total
payoffs and the Nash equilibrium actions emerge as the response of both material payoffs
and personal norms xt. Eη,γ [At] = (Eη,γ [A1,t],Eη,γ [A2,t]) ∈ [0, 1]2 is the vector of average
equilibrium actions of each community in period t, where Eρ[.] is the expectation operator
with respect to the measure ρ.
Stage (o) At the end of their life, every agent reproduces asexually giving birth to one
child. At this stage, parents transmit new norms and choose how much to socialize their
offsprings. During the transmission, parents are assumed to be partially myopic: they are
able to anticipate the socialization game of their offspring, stage (a), but they are not able
to anticipate their future utility from playing 2× 2 games. We model the feedback from
the environment (game) to norms as a cultural transmission where the Nash equilibrium
action most played in the game contribute to determine the inherited personal norms of
the new generation. In particular, cognitive dissonance moves the choice of the norm
θt+1 to be transmitted while cultural substitution moves the choice of the socialization
parameter ft+1.
7
In the next section, we start our analysis from the illustration of the norm formation
in the young age. Next, we consider the effect of norms on the payoffs of games played
in agent’s adult life. Finally, we characterize the transmission process. In the first two
sections, we avoid the time index to simplify the notation.
7Cultural substitution is microfounded in Appendix B.
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2.1 Young Age Norms’ Formation
In this section, we model agents choice of ex-post norms x, stemming from the inherited
norms θ and horizontal socializations f . In our model, young agents (children) are active
in choosing their own personal norm.
As in many cultural evolution paper (e.g. Kuran and Sandholm, 2008), agent ex-post
norms x are the result of social interaction. The general idea is that agents’ choice of
a norm is affected both by inherited norms and by the average ex-post norm chosen by
peers, as dependent on the horizontal socializations.8 Since we have two communities,
and we assume that all agents within the same community are equal, inherited norms,
socialization levels and, as a result, ex-post norms are two-dimensional vectors.9 The
norm xi is chosen by each agent in community i ∈ I by maximizing
ui(x, θi, fi) = − fi(xi − Eη[x])2︸ ︷︷ ︸
social coordination
− (1− fi)(xi − θi)2︸ ︷︷ ︸
group (or family) identity
,
where Eη[x] is taken over the distribution of individual characteristics and it is the average
chosen norm.10 Since fi is the horizontal socialization, (1 − fi) is the vertical socializa-
tion. The utility function captures the tension between inherited preferences, θi, and
coordinating with others: when choosing a personal norm agents want to pick a norm
not too different from the one of their peers, depending on their horizontal socialization
parameter.11
Given the distributions (θ1, θ2) and (f1, f2), the ex-post personal norms (x1, x2) are
found as the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium of the social interaction game, where
agents of the same type choose the same ex-post personal norm.
Proposition 1
For all θ ∈ [0, 1]2 and f ∈ [0, f¯ ]2, there exists a unique symmetric Nash Equilibrium
x ∈ [0, 1]2 of the norm formation game with
xi = fi
(
Eη [θ]− covη[f, θ]
(1− Eη[f ])
)
+ (1− fi)θi for i = 1, 2. (1)
8This is consistent with sociological literature about social norms, see Bicchieri et al. (2018) for a survey.
9Notice that, in principle, agents in the same community can make different choices. However, we focus only
on symmetric choices for all the agents of the same community and thus, with an abuse of notation, we use
only the community index from the beginning.
10Eη[x] can be seen as descriptive norm (Muldoon et al., 2014). Notice that since agents are myopic in their
youth they are not able to anticipate future payoffs and thus form their norms taking in consideration only
parents and peers pressure and not the subsequent strategic environment.
11This formulation is exactly equivalent to the conformity game played by children in Vaughan (2013). More-
over, beauty contest like utility function, such as the one used in Morris and Shin (2002), is widely used both
in the literature of evolution of cultural traits (Kuran and Sandholm, 2008, among others) as well as in net-
work economics for opinion or belief learning and dynamics (Golub and Jackson, 2012; Bolletta and Pin, 2019;
Della Lena, 2019), where it can be seen as a micro-foundation of the so called De Groot model (DeGroot, 1974)
9
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The average norm is
Eη[x] = Eη[θ]−
(
Eη[f ]
1− Eη[f ]
)
covη[f, θ]. (2)
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The result is a generalization of Kuran and Sandholm (2008). In that setting, f is the
same for both groups, cov[f, θ] = 0, and thus by (2) Eη[x] = Eη[θ]: the population aver-
age ex-post norm is equivalent to the population average inherited norm. In our model,
the heterogeneity of horizontal socialization introduces a distortion in the distribution of
ex-post norms. Even a minority, if enough rigid, can make her group norms prevail.
The following corollary expresses equilibrium norms as a convex combination of inher-
ited norms, where pi is the weight that each community i gives to the inherited norm of
community 1 (the majority).
Corollary 1.1
The Nash Equilibrium of Proposition 1 can be written asx1 = p1θ1 + (1− p1)θ2x2 = p2θ1 + (1− p2)θ2 , (3)
where p1 =
(1−f1)(1−f2(1−η))
1−f1η−f2(1−η) ∈ (0, 1), p2 =
f2η(1−f1)
1−f1η−f2(1−η) ∈ (0, 1) and p1 > p2 for all
η, f1, f2.
Social interaction makes each agent choose as norm a convex combination between her
initial norm and the one of the other community. Weights depend on both types social-
ization parameters and the majority size η. By taking the difference of p1 and p2, it can
be easily seen that p1 is always greater that p2. Thus if θ1 > θ2, then x1 > x2 (and
viceversa): it is not possible to have a switch of ordering between ex-ante and ex-post
norms. Finally note that fi = 0 implies xi = θi.
2.2 Nash Equilibria for Normal Form Games with Norms
In this section, we model how norms change the payoffs of each one-stage game and study
the implication on the game’s (pure) Nash equilibria.
In their adult age, agents use norms to make strategic decisions. Their choice is affected
both by material and immaterial payoffs. The latter are represented by the willingness
to choose an action as indicated by their norms. Some norms are often associated with
cooperative environment while others with competitive ones. Below we provide anecdotal
10
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examples about norms associated with environments with strategic complementarity or
substitutability.
Language (complements) When people interact in a multicultural environment, they
have to choose the language to use. On the one hand, there are evident “material” incen-
tives to coordinate on the same language. On the other hand, agents can have different
preferences in using a specific language (norms). Preferences for one language can depend
on the relative pleasure of using it, on agents ability to speak it, or on other idiosyncrasies.
Attitude toward conflict (substitutes) In competitive interactions for shared re-
sources, the material incentive are to anti-coordinate, the optimal action is to be ag-
gressive, “fight”, when the other agent is not, “flight”, and viceversa (as in hawks-doves
class of games). In this case, the material incentives are as in anti-coordination games.
Work ethics (complements/substitutes) In interacting at the workplace people may
face both an environment with strategic complements and substitutes. If we consider a
work task that needs a team effort to be accomplished and there is no reward if both agents
do not exert a high level of effort, agents have incentives to coordinate and the game is
with strategic complements. On the contrary, easy tasks that can be accomplished with
the effort of only one agent open the doors for free-riding and the game is with strategic
substitutes. These two examples can be thought as, on the one hand, a tough environment
where resources are extractable at high labor cost and where agents have to cooperate
(complements), and, on the other hand, a flourishing environment where there are abun-
dant and easily extractable resources, in which some agents have the chance to free-ride
(substitutes).
We represent the tasks that individuals face with symmetric bi-matrix games where norms
interact with material payoffs and lead to the total, material plus immaterial, payoff. For
each bi-matrix game Γ, the set of players is N = {r, c} and the action space is defined
as A = Ar × Ac where Ar = Ac = {1, 0} is the set of actions available for each player
(e.g. language A or language B, being aggressive or not, high effort or low effort at the
workplace). The material payoff of the bi-matrix game is symmetric and pir(1, 1) = a,
pir(0, 1) = b, pir(1, 0) = c, and pir(0, 0) = d (all strictly positive).
We consider norms as preferences over actions, namely, the closer the action to a
norm, the higher the perceived utility.12 Therefore, the experienced ultimate payoffs are,
in general, different from the material payoffs. In particular, naming ir the community of
12We could express this ordering of preferences over consequences in the framework of psychological games
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989; Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2009, among others) where players have belief-dependent
motivations (such as intentions-based reciprocity, emotions, or concern with others’ opinion); the main difference
is that in our framework, the payoff of each agent does not depend on beliefs about others.
11
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player r, for each action profile A = (Ar, Ac) player r payoff function with norms is
Πr(A;xir) =
 xirpir(1, Ac) when Ar = 1(1− xir)pir(0, Ac) when Ar = 0 . (4)
The same modification of the material payoff holds also for player c, whose community is
denoted as jc. Table 1 represents the payoff matrix associated with Γ.
Agent c
1 0
Agent r
1 xira, xjca xirc, (1− xjc)b
0 (1− xir)b, xjcc (1− xir)d, (1− xjc)d
Table 1: Bi-matrix game with norms as preferences over behavior
Concentrating on agent r, when xir =
1
2 the transformation is just a rescaling of pay-
offs, Πr
(
A; 12
)
= 12pir(A), and thus has no effect on best replies. Thus, the norm is said
to be neutral. On the contrary, when xir > 1/2 the norm is in favor of action 1 so that
agent r total payoff for playing action 1 is larger than when the norm is neutral or in favor
of action 2, (xir < 1/2). The larger the norm the larger such an influence. If the norm is
extreme (xir = 0 or xir = 1), the agent always plays the associated action, thus giving
no importance to material payoffs.
Modeling the effect of norms as in (4) we capture the idea that norms change pref-
erences over material payoffs, as in Bisin et al. (2004) and Tabellini (2008) but, at the
same time, when norms are extreme (0 or 1), the transformation is consistent with the
interpretation of Carvalho (2016) where norms restrict agents’ strategy set.13
Since we are interested in studying the evolution of norms when agents are exposed
to different strategic environments, namely when in absence of norms actions are strate-
gic complements or substitutes, we restrict the ordering of the material payoffs a, b, c, d.
Measuring with b¯ = ba+b the material force that leads out from the equilibrium (1, 1) and
with d¯ = dc+d the material force that pushes toward the equilibrium (0, 0), it is possible
to categorize the possible games with material payoffs pi(A) as Γ(b¯, d¯). In particular
1. Coordination (strategic complements): b¯ < 12 < d¯
13An agent that takes into account both material and moral payoffs as in (4) can be seen as “Homo Moralis”
in the language of Alger and Weibull (2013). Moreover, the functional form for payoffs (4) is also consistent
with one commonly used in the behavioral literature on social norms (Lo´pez-Pe´rez, 2008; Kessler and Leider,
2012; Kimbrough and Vostroknutov, 2016) where a cost function c of violating the norm is subtracted to the
material payoff: Πr(A;xir ) = pir(A)− c(xi,r,A, pi). Indeed, with c(xir ,A, pi) = pir(Ar, Ac)(Ar + xir (1− 2Ar))
we get exactly equation (4).
12
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2. Anti-Coordination (strategic substitutes): d¯ < 12 < b¯.
14
Similarly to norms, also b¯ and d¯ belong to the interval [0, 1]. However, they represent
material, instead of moral, incentives. If b¯ = d¯ = 12 , then there are no material incentives.
A game with both moral and material incentives is denoted as Γ(b¯, d¯,x).
We can now proceed with the equilibrium analysis. For simplicity, we assume complete
information about material payoffs, norms, and rationality of agents and we use (pure
strategy) Nash equilibrium as the solution concept.
The equilibrium analysis relies on the double effect on moral and material incentives.
Moral incentives depend on the consistency between norms and actions. Therefore, the
final decision depends on the strength of the norm as compared to the two threshold b¯
and d¯. b¯ establishes the minimum strength of the norm for action 1 to be played when
the opponent plays 1. d¯ establishes the maximum strength of the norm for action 0 to be
played when the opponent plays 0.15
Define Aˆ(b¯, d¯, x) = Aˆr(b¯, d¯, xir)× Aˆc(b¯, d¯, xjc) the set of Nash Equilibria with norms.
Proposition 2 Given the game with norms Γ(b¯, d¯, x):
• If xir > b¯ and xjc > b¯, then (1, 1) ∈ Aˆ(b¯, d¯, x).
• If xir < d¯ and xjc < d¯, then (0, 0) ∈ Aˆ(b¯, d¯, x).
• If xir > d¯ and xjc < b¯, then (1, 0) ∈ Aˆ(b¯, d¯, x).
• if xir < b¯ and xjc > d¯, then (0, 1) ∈ Aˆ(b¯, d¯, x).
Proof. In the Appendix. 
The results of Proposition 2 are represented in Figures 1 where equilibrium actions played
by agents belonging to the two different communities are shown as a function of norms
and for different strategic environments: complements (left) or substitutes (right). The
set of Nash Equilibria depends on the position of threshold values d¯ and b¯. Figure 1(a)
represents a game with strategic complements, b¯ < 12 < d¯. Figure 1(b) represents a game
with strategic substitutes, d¯ < 12 < b¯. On the main diagonal there are Nash Equilib-
ria when agents have the same norm. When the action is marked with the subscript
∗, it is dominant. As expected, for xir and xjc in the neighborhood of neutral norms
(xir = xjc =
1
2), the games have the same equilibria as the corresponding game without
norms, while as xir and xjc move away from
1
2 the games have have different equilibria.
14 Notice that restricting the ordering of b¯, d¯, 12 can be used to characterize even Prisoner Dilemma and
Efficient Dominant Strategy Equilibrium games, where 12 < min{b¯, d¯} and 12 > max{b¯, d¯}, respectively. Our
general analysis applies also to these other games but we focus on complements vs substitutes. See also the
discussion in Section 4.
15This is consistent, even if in a totally different framework, with Eshel et al. (1998), who found that the
imitation dynamics depends only upon the values α and β which are strictly related respectively with our b¯ and
d¯.
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(a) (b)
Figure 1: Nash Equilibria as a function of norms (x1, x2). The row player (vertical axis) belongs
to community 1, the column player (horizontal axis) belongs to community 2. (a) Complements,
b¯ < 12 < d¯ and (b) Substitutes, d¯ <
1
2 < b¯. A star denotes that the action is dominant.
When xir > max{d¯, b¯} or xir < min{d¯, b¯}, r has a dominant strategy, respectively playing
1 or playing 0. Otherwise, if min{d¯, b¯} < xir < max{d¯, b¯}, then r has not a dominant
strategy and reacts to the action of c. Thus if both xir and xjc are between min{d¯, b¯} and
max{d¯, b¯}, then we have multiple equilibria. We now interpret the results with respect
the two anecdotal examples of language and attitude toward conflict.
Language (complements) The interaction of norms with the incentive for coordi-
nation may result in different Nash equilibria. If the norm is strong and equal in both
communities, norms and incentives are aligned on one language. If one norm is strong,
say of community 1, and the other is mild, of community 2, community 1 uses always the
preferred language while community 2 uses the language preferred by community 1 when
matched with 1 and can use either language when matched with a player of community 2.
If norms of the two communities are strong but different, the game could instead become
an anti-coordination one, where each member of a community uses only its most preferred
language (polarization). The stronger the material incentives to coordinates the stronger
should be the norm to obtain polarization.
Attitude toward conflict (substitutes) Norms in the form of attitude toward
conflict could change the Nash equilibria as well. If, for example the norms of players are
strong and aligned, the game could result in one where both players flight (or fight). On
the contrary, two strong and not aligned norms have the effect of selecting one equilibrium
with anti-coordination. Finally, if the norm of one community is mild while the one of
14
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other community is strong then the members of that community anti-coordinate with
members of the other one, and are indifferent in interacting among themselves.
2.3 Cultural Transmission
At the end of each time period t, given the action played during their adult age, agents
transmit new norms θt+1 to their offsprings and decide how much let them socialize with
the peers by transmitting a horizontal socialization ft+1. In this section, we model both
transmissions as a function of generation t norms, xt, socializations, ft, and average
actions chosen when playing the one-stage games.
The average action depends on the distribution of games each agent is playing in
her adult age. We shall assume that in each period agents play different games. In
particular, we name γ a probability distribution on the space of vectors (b¯, d¯) and assume
that the game with payoffs Γ(b¯, d¯; xt) is played with probability γ(b¯, d¯). In order to study
the effect of different strategic environment on norms dynamics, we further assume that
games played belong always to the same environment. In complements environments
b¯ ∈ [0, 12] and d¯ ∈ [12 , 1], viceversa for substitutes environments b¯ ∈ [12 , 1] and d¯ ∈ [0, 12].
We focus our analysis on the two extreme cases: (i) γ is a uniform distribution on sets
of (b¯, d¯) with support
[
0, 12
] × [12 , 1] for complements and [12 , 1] × [0, 12] for substitutes.
(ii) γ is a point distribution on an element of the set
[
0, 12
]× [12 , 1] for complements and[
1
2 , 1
]× [0, 12] for substitutes.
2.3.1 Formation of Transmitted Norms
First, we assume that agents try to reduce the cognitive dissonance that arises if there is no
consistency between their original preference over actions xt and their average behavior.
The latter, Eη,γ [Ai,t], is computed taking into account that agents are randomly matched
to play against the whole population and that they face one-stage games drawn from
the distribution γ. Thus, an agent belonging to the majority, community i = 1, will be
matched η time with his own type and 1− η with others, viceversa for a player belonging
to the minority. Moreover, each agent in her adult life plays an infinite number of games
with different payoffs (b¯, d¯) distributed according to γ.
We model cognitive dissonance by letting the ex ante personal norms of each com-
munity i generation t + 1, θi,t+1, to move towards the transmitted actions Eη,γ [Ai,t] as
dependent on the influence of games on norms λ ∈ (0, 1):
θi,t+1 = (1− λ)xi,t + λEη,γ [Ai,t] =: ζi(xi,t,Eη,γ [Ai,t]). (5)
If λ = 0 the strategic environment has no effect on the evolution of norms, similarly the
15
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case considered by Kuran and Sandholm (2008). Otherwise, the inherited norm of the
next generation depends directly on the norm of the parent xi,t and indirectly also on the
strategic environment through the average equilibrium actions in Eη,γ [Ai,t]. Parents want
to transmit to their offsprings norms that are a combination of their norms and of what
they have learned to be the best action in the specific strategic environment they face.
Note that an equivalent motivation for this form of the feedback is a sociological story:
since children, in the vertical socialization process, are able to observe both norms and
behavior, they inherit norms similar to those of their parents but biased toward parental
behavior.
In order to find the average action played by the representative agent of one commu-
nity, Eη,γ [Ai,t], we have to integrate actions with respect to both population and payoffs
measure, η and γ.16 In particular, all the time agents play a game with a unique Nash
equilibrium the transmitted action is uniquely defined to be the Nash equilibrium one.
When, instead, the played game has not a unique Nash equilibrium, we assume indiffer-
ence on the type of action that is transmitted. Thus, each time an agent of community
i plays against an agent of community j in period t, the transmitted action is (assuming
without loss of generality that she is the row player)
Ai,j,t =
Aˆr,t(b¯, d¯, x) if the Nash equilibrium is unique1
2 otherwise
.
Notice that, whenever there are multiple equilibria, the feedback from actions to norms of
a player of community i when playing with a player of community j in date t is Ai,j,t =
1
2 .
17
In Figure 2, we show average actions for agents of both communities for different (x1, x2),
in both complements and substitutes game. Integrating over games and communities, we
get the vector of average actions:18
Eη,γ [At] = (Eη,γ [A1,t],Eη,γ [A2,t]) =: ϕ(xt). (6)
2.3.2 Formation of Horizontal Socialization
The dynamics of the socialization level depends on the outcome of the strategic interaction
and it is modeled assuming cultural substitution.19
16Notice that, due to the assumption of independence the order of integration does not affect the result and
Eη,γ [.] = Eγ,η[.]
17A different possibility could be to consider the Mixed Nash equilibrium. However, in several empirical works
the approximation of 12 is widely used in presence of multiple equilibria (Bjorn and Vuong, 1984; Kooreman,
1994; Soetevent and Kooreman, 2007).
18It is possible to take into account different levels of assortativity in the matching, see discussion in Section
4.
19Under cultural substitution “parents have fewer incentives to socialize their children the more widely dom-
inant are their values in the population” Bisin and Verdier (2001).
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(a) (b)
Figure 2: Eη[A1,t],Eη[A2,t] in strategic settings with (a) Strategic complements
(
b¯ ≤ 12 ≤ d¯
)
, (b)
Strategic substitutes
(
d¯ ≤ 12 ≤ b¯
)
. As in Figure 1, we assume that the row player (vertical axis)
belongs to community 1 while the column player (horizontal axis) belongs to community 2.
We assume that the more their action is close to the average of the society, the more
agents let their offsprings horizontally socialize with the peers (the less they vertically
socialize them). Given the average action in the whole society,
A¯t = ηEη,γ [A1,t] + (1− η)Eη,γ [A2,t],
the transmitted horizontal socialization for a representative agent of community i is
fi,t+1 = f¯(1− |Eη,γ [Ai,t]− A¯t|) =: ψi(Eη,γ [At]). (7)
The horizontal socialization of community i depends directly on the differences between
the average action of the agent and the average action of the whole society. f¯ is the
maximum possible flexibility parameter of the society, namely the highest level of hori-
zontal socialization of a community toward the whole society, and thus also to the other
community. When the distance between actions is maximal, the components of f go to
their lower bound. When the distance is minimal (agents play all the same action) both
components of f reach the upper bound: f = (f¯ , f¯), where f¯ < 1.
It is important to underline that we have assumed cultural substitution and the specific
functional form (7) to have tractability in the dynamics. However, in Appendix B, we
microfound it showing that (7) is consistent with partially myopic parents, with utility
function as in Panebianco (2014), who are able to anticipate the socialization game of
their offspring, but they are not able to anticipate their utility when adult.
17
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3 Norm and Socialization Level Dynamics
In this section, we analyze the joint dynamics of norms, Nash equilibrium actions, and
socialization levels for environments where, under material payoffs, actions are strategic
complements or substitutes.
As anticipated in Section 2.1, the chosen norm x depends directly on inherited norm
θ and horizontal socialization f . Introducing the time dimension and using eq. (1) for a
representative agent of both communities i ∈ I, we define the vector function υ(.) such
that
xt+1 = υ(θt+1,ft+1). (8)
Combining equations (6 - 8) we get the dynamics of our model
xt
ϕ(.)−−−−−−→ Eη,γ [At] ζ(.), ψ(.)−−−−−−−−→ (θt+1,ft+1) υ(.)−−−→ xt+1.
or
xt+1 = υ(ζ(xt,ϕ(xt)),ψ(ϕ(xt))) =: Ξ(xt). (9)
We define E the set of steady states of (9), E := {x∗ ∈ [0, 1]2 : x = Ξ(x)}. From each
steady-state norm x∗, we can derive the corresponding steady-state actions (Eη,γ [A∗1],Eη,γ [A∗2]),
the steady-state horizontal socialization levels (f∗1 , f∗2 ), and the steady-state equilibrium
weights (p∗1, p∗2) that link ex-post and ex-ante norms, as defined in Corollary 1.1. First,
we provide a relation between norms and average actions at the steady state.
Proposition 3
Given the norm dynamics in (9), for all strategic environments, each steady-state norm
x∗ solves x∗1 = φ∗1Eη,γ [A∗1] + (1− φ∗1)Eη,γ [A∗2]x∗2 = φ∗2Eη,γ [A∗1] + (1− φ∗2)Eη,γ [A∗2] , (10)
where φ∗1 =
p∗1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ)
1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ) and φ
∗
2 =
p∗2
1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ) .
Proof. In the Appendix. 
In a steady state, norms are a convex combination of the average actions played by the
agents of the two communities. Weights (φ∗1, φ∗2) depend on the steady state norms x∗
through horizontal socialization levels f∗ and weight p∗1 and p∗2. The size of the majority
η and the influence of games on norms λ also play a role.
Next, we find steady-state norms, and characterize their stability, for both comple-
ments and substitutes environments. Below, we consider uniform distributions of material
payoffs. In Section 3.2, we consider point distributions.
18
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3.1 Uniform Distribution of Material Payoffs
In this section the payoff distribution γ is uniform distribution on sets of material payoffs
(b¯, d¯). We consider separately cases where material payoffs imply that actions are strategic
complements or substitutes.
3.1.1 Strategic Complements
In their adult age, agents face an environment with strategic complementarity when each
game they play has material payoffs with 0 ≤ b¯ ≤ 12 ≤ d¯ ≤ 1. Assuming that payoffs are
uniformly distributed, we choose b¯ and d¯ uniformly in [0, 12 ] and [
1
2 , 1], respectively, and
independently for each other.
As we show below, there exists (only) steady states where both communities share
the same, extreme or neutral, norm. Here, the level of horizontal socialization is maximal
and communities play the same Nash equilibrium action. The set of steady states norms
is Ed := {(1, 1), (0, 0), (12 , 12)}, all with maximal socialization f¯ , and with average actions
Eη,γ [A∗] equal to (1, 1), (0, 0), and
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, respectively. Moreover the steady state where
both communities have the same strong norm, (1, 1) and (0, 0), are stable, while the state
with neutral norms,
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, is a saddle.
Proposition 4 (Complements)
For all η ∈ [12 , 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), and λ ∈ (0, 1), if (b¯, d¯) is uniformly distributed in the set[
0, 12
]× [12 , 1], then the set of steady states is Ed. Moreover, (1, 1) is asymptotically stable
with basin of attraction at least
(
1
2 , 1
]2
, (0, 0) is asymptotically stable with the basin of
attraction at least
[
0, 12
)2
, and
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
is a saddle.
Proof. in the Appendix 
In an environment with strategic complementarity, if payoffs are uniformly distributed
over
[
0, 12
]× [12 , 1], the two stable long-run outcomes are assimilation toward one extreme
norm, either 0 or 1. In each stable equilibrium, the prevailing norm solves the Nash equi-
librium selection issue typical of coordination games. In our framework, whether norms
converge to 1 or 0 depends on the initial norms and thus, in turn, on basins of attraction.
For all initial conditions, but those on the saddle path leading to the neutral norm 12 , both
community converge to the same norm, as well as to the corresponding Nash equilibrium
action, and the horizontal socialization is at its maximum.
3.1.2 Strategic Substitutes
We now discuss results for an environment with strategic substitutability where agents
play several games in which 0 ≤ d¯ ≤ 12 ≤ b¯ ≤ 1. Whereas in an environment with strategic
complements both games played by agents in the youth age (the norm formation game)
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and the adult age (the 2 × 2 strategic interaction) favor coordination among agents,
with strategic substitutes two opposite forces are at play: coordination in youth and
anti-coordination in the adult age. As we shall see, the relative strength of the two, as
dependent on the relationship between the parameter that describes the maximum possible
horizontal socialization (f¯) and the strength of the cognitive dissonance (λ), determines
long-run outcomes.
In games with substitutes, other than the set of steady states where both communities
share the same norm and the socialization level is at its maximum, Ed, there exists a set of
polarized steady states where the two communities use different norms and the horizontal
socialization level is low, Ep := {( x1, x2) ∈
[
1
2 , 1
] × [0, 12] , ( ◦x1, ◦x2) ∈ [0, 12] × [12 , 1]}. To
maintain analytic tractability, in the next proposition we provide results only when the
two communities have the same size, η = 12 .
Proposition 5 (Substitutes)
For η = 12 and λ ∈ (0, 1), if (b¯, d¯) is uniformly distributed in the set
[
0, 12
] × [12 , 1], then
there exist fˆ ≥ λ2+λ such that
• If f¯ > fˆ , then the set of steady states is Ed and (12 , 12) is the globally stable steady
state.
• If f¯ < fˆ , then the set of steady states is Ed ∪ Ep and the strong norm states (0, 0)
and (1, 1) are unstable. Moreover:
– If 0 < f¯ < λ2+λ , then
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
is a saddle, (

x1,

x2) is asymptotically stable with
basin of attraction at least
[
1
2 , 1
] × [0, 12], ( ◦x1, ◦x2) is asymptotically stable with
basin of attraction of at least
[
0, 12
]× [12 , 1];
– If λ2+λ < f¯ < fˆ , then all norms in Ep ∪ (12 , 12) are asymptotically stable.
Proof. In the Appendix 
In an environment with substitutes and uniformly distributed material payoffs, there
still exist steady states with assimilation as in the previous (complements) case, however
they are unstable. Stable steady states depend on the tension between the young age
social interaction and the strategic environment faced in the adult age. If the young age
social interaction is very strong also across the two communities (f¯ > fˆ), the only stable
long run outcome is the erosion of norms (12 ,
1
2) (as in Calabuig et al., 2016). On the con-
trary, with low social interaction, f¯ < fˆ , there exist stable steady states with polarization.
In the latter, norms are polarized, e.g.

x1 >
1
2 and

x2 <
1
2 , agents of the two communities
play on average opposite actions (Eη,γ [

A1],Eη,γ [

A2]) ∈
[ 
x1, 1
]
×
[
0,

x2
]
, and the more the
actions are polarized the more the horizontal socialization is low. (symmetrically for
◦
x1
and
◦
x2).
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(a) (b)
Figure 3: Norm dynamics for (a) Strategic Complements and (b) Strategic Substitutes when f¯ < λ2+λ .
When f¯ < fˆ , whether the polarized steady states are the only possible long-run
outcomes or norm neutrality is also a possible long-run outcome depends on the relative
size of the horizontal socialization response to behavioral heterogeneity (f¯) and agents’
cognitive dissonance (λ). The higher the cognitive dissonance, the higher the effect of
strategic substitutes in the adult age games, making norm neutrality a saddle. This
is always the case when f¯ = 0, so that horizontal socialization does not play a role
and children care only about inherited norms, leading to fully polarized norms, either
(

x1 = 1,

x2 = 0) or (
◦
x1 = 0,
◦
x2 = 1).
The main implication of Propositions 4 and 5 is that different strategic environments
lead to different long-run norms and equilibrium behavior. An environment with strategic
complementarity always leads to norms that are strong and homogeneous across both
communities. Instead, in environments with strategic substitutability, there exist stable
steady states with polarization of norms or, when the norm is homogeneous it is neutral
in both communities. Whether polarization or erosion of norms is the long-run outcomes
depends on the relative size of cognitive dissonance and horizontal socialization.
3.2 Point Distribution of Material Payoffs
In the previous section, we have shown that with strategic complements and uniformly
distributed payoffs stable norms are strong and homogeneous. An empirical observation
is that an environment that favors coordination is not always enough to ensure the occur-
rence of complete assimilation of the minority or to avoid the occurrence of polarization
in a society. The process of cultural integration may fail to achieve complete assimilation,
having the resilience of cultural traits, or even lead to norms’ polarization.20 Bisin and
20We refer to Berry (1997) and Ryder et al. (2000) (among others) for the terminology about cultural
assimilation, integration, marginalization, and polarization (also separation). They proposed a concept
of minority’s self-identification, based on a two-dimensional framework, which takes into account for differences
in both adaptation and interaction processes between the minority and the dominant culture.
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Verdier (2011) offer a review of empirical examples of cultural heterogeneity and resilience
of cultural traits: the slow rate of immigrants’ integration in Europe and US, the per-
sistence of ‘ethnic capital’ in second- and third-generation immigrants, e.g. minorities’
strongly attachment to their original languages and cultural traits.
In this section, we show how to reconcile our model of norm formation with these
empirical observations. We do so by considering limit cases of point distributions of
material payoffs, namely by imposing γ to be singular on the set (b¯, d¯). We shall show
that polarization can occur even in environments with complements while mild cultural
heterogeneity can occur both in environments with complements, favoring convergence of
norms, and in environments with substitutes, favoring divergence of norms.
As with the uniform distribution of payoffs the exact nature of these stable norms
depends on whether the strategic interaction taking place in the adult age is characterized
by strategic substitutes or complements. We start our analysis with the latter.21
3.2.1 Strategic Complements
Figure 4 shows all the possible steady states in environments with complements. The
first result is that two stable steady states with polarization (and minimal horizontal
socialization) can exist depending on the value of b¯ and d¯ and on the norms’ distance
between the two communities. For simplicity, we now formally present only one of the
two steady states with polarization (the upper left blue dot in Figure 4), the other (the
lower right blue dot) can be easily derived by symmetry.
Figure 4: Steady States of x for complements with b¯ = 0.2, d¯ = 0.8, f¯ = 0.3, η = 0.5, λ = 0.6.
The existence of steady states depend on the relative size of material incentives (b¯, d¯)
and average actions weights defined in Proposition 3. If b¯ > φ∗1 and d¯ < φ∗2 and initial
norms belong to the region R1∗,0∗ , then the dynamics described in (9) converges to the
steady state (φ∗1, φ∗2), with socialization (f¯η, f¯(1 − η)). Norms are polarized, horizontal
21We keep the analysis at a descriptive level, more details can be found in the Appendix.
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socialization is at its minimum, and agents belonging to different communities always play
different actions, Eη,γ [A∗] = (1, 0). This occurs despite in all rounds agents are playing a
coordination game, according to material payoffs.
The result is driven from the fact that if games played in adult life have always the
same non degenerate payoffs, then there exist initial norms, x1,0 high enough and x2,0
low enough, that sustain the equilibrium with anti-coordination. Playing this equilibrium
leads, by cognitive dissonance, to norms polarization.
If agents interaction features complementarity another class of steady states can exist
(white in Figure 4), where there is cultural integration but not complete assimilation.
In such steady states, only the agents of one community have a well-defined group-specific
norm, which induce them to always play a specific action as dominant strategy. Agents
belonging to the other community have a neutral norm. When the latter are matched
among themselves, they face the original coordination problem, while they conform to
the behavior of agents with a strong norm whenever they encounter them. This is a clear
example of integration, namely there is convergence toward a homogeneous norm, but,
at the same time, the identity is not totally lost as in assimilation.
Real life examples of this result are linguistic choices between immigrants and natives.
Natives always use their own language. Agents belonging to a linguistic minority start
with a different norm and, after a long interaction with natives, they end up using the
two languages indifferently, but conforming with the natives whenever they interact with
them.
In steady states with integration, we have two sources of symmetry. One is with
respect to the community with a well defined norm, the other with respect to the action
played. Therefore there can exist up to four steady states of this type. Again we formally
characterize only one of these equilibria. Let us focus on the region R1∗,1, were there can
exist a steady state where b¯ < x∗2 < d¯ and Eη,γ [A] =
(
1, 12(1 + η)
)
. Notice that with point
distribution steady state with intergation but not assimilation are stable, provided they
exist. However, there are values of material incentives (b¯, d¯) such that they do not exist,
as shown in Figure 5. On the contrary, steady states with assimilation always exist (and
are always stable).22
The difference between assimilation and integration equilibria is important with
respect to different policy goals. For example, sometimes a policy is considered successful
only when minorities (immigrants) completely lose their previous norms or culture and
are assimilated; instead in other circumstances the resilience of cultural traits can be
considered socially desirable, in these cases the policymaker reaches its goal if the minority
integrates with the majority but keeps some of their cultural traits. In this second case,
there is partial convergence and there is still room for a multicultural society.
22In Appendix A.8 we prove that with point distributions of payoffs all steady states are asymptotically stable.
The issue is thus whether a steady state exists or not, given material payoffs, rather than if it is stable.
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Figure 5: Steady states of the norm dynamics for strategic complements with (b¯ = 0.2, d¯ = 0.8) and
(d¯′ = 0.7, b¯′ = 0.1). Left panel: change from d to d′. Right panel: change from d to d′ and from b to
b′. In both plots, f¯ = 0.3, η = 0.5, λ = 0.6.
Moreover, from a policy point of view, it is interesting to appraise the long-run effects
due to a change in game incentives (Figure 5). We observe that moving the material
incentives b¯ and d¯ can significantly affect the social outcome. In Figure 5 (left panel) we
can see how diminishing d¯ to d¯′ the basin of attraction of the steady state with assimilation
(grey) becomes much wider and integration (white) disappears. Figure 5 (right panel)
shows that in such a case, moving the two material incentives together, d¯ to d¯′ and b¯
to b¯′, it is possible to reach assimilation even if the communities start off having initial
norms that are polarized. This sheds further light on the relationship between uniform
and point distribution. In fact, if (b¯, d¯) is not a single point, but moves in the whole space[
0, 12
] × [12 , 1], then the steady states presented in this section are not robust to game
change.
3.2.2 Strategic Substitutes
Figure 6 shows all the possible steady states in environments with strategic substitutes
when γ is singular. The main difference with the case of uniform distribution is that steady
states with assimilation can be stable. Comparing the long-run norms with the case of
point distribution and strategic complements, steady states with cultural integration do
not exist. Moreover, in environments with substitutes, steady states may exist (white
in Figure 6) where one community has a well defined norm while the members of the
other community have a norm that, when they are matched among themselves, does not
induce preferences over actions. Namely, interacting in their own community agents are
indifferent on the action to play, but when matched with the other community they act in
the opposite way. In a sense, we can talk about marginalization, in fact, there is a partial
polarization of norms with low socialization across communities.
In environments with strategic substitutes policies that aim to reach cultural integra-
tion are not possible. Cultural assimilation is still possible but it is not reachable starting
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from polarized norms, even if we weaken material incentives to anti-coordinate. These
incentives determine if there exists steady states with marginalization or polarization.
Lowering material incentives enlarges the region of initial norms that lead to norm neu-
trality. Differently from the uniform distribution of material payoffs (Proposition 5) the
relative size of the maximum horizontal socialization f¯ and cognitive dissonance parameter
λ do not play a role for stability but only for the speed of convergence.23
Figure 6: Steady states of the norm dynamics for strategic substitutes with b¯ = 0.8, d¯ = 0.2,
f¯ = η = 0.5, λ = 0.75. In the extreme case where b¯ = d¯ = 0.5, the neutral norm (0.5, 0.5) is the only
steady state and it is globally stable.
23See the Proof of Proposition A.8 in the Appendix for details.
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4 Discussion
In this section we discuss possible extensions of the model.
Payoffs Distribution This paper is a first attempt to analyze the effect of different
strategic environment on the dynamics of norms. While, we study only extreme cases for
the payoffs’ distribution (uniform and point), our analysis can be generalized to many
others payoffs distributions. If the distribution is still uniform, important parameters to
understand the existence and stability of stable norms are the boundary points (highest
and lowest) of the payoffs distribution of material incentives (b¯, d¯). In the interior points
of the support the dynamics is the same as studied in 3.1, while outside results discussed
in 3.2 hold. Considering probability distributions different from the uniform one, the
analysis is less straightforward as it depends on the density in the tails. Our conjecture
is that it is possible to establish threshold values over which the density is vanishing and
such that the dynamics is the same as with a uniform distribution defined within these
threshold. Thresholds should depend, non trivially, on the whole distribution, including
moments higher than the second. Although all these possible intermediate cases could be
interesting to study, their analysis is beyond the scope of this paper.
Assortativity We have studied the case of perfect random matching without taking
into account the possibility of having assortative matching. In order to consider different
levels of assortativity, it is enough to consider a parameter  that can assume values less
than η for the minority (1 − η for the majority) and add it to the probability of being
matched with agents belonging to the same community. This generalization does not
affect results.24 In environments with complements, the only effect of a higher level of
assortativity is to slow down the convergence to the steady state norm for minority and
speed it up for the majority, thus the assimilation of norms occurs at a slower pace. On
the contrary, in environments with substitutes, a higher level of assortativity decreases
the speed of convergence to the steady state, and thus to the polarization. This would
suggest us that, from the prospective of a policy maker who wants to favor assimilation,
in environments with complements is better to facilitate across-communities interactions,
while in environments with substitutes is better to avoid them.
Mixed Environments In this paper we keep the class of strategic environment fixed
to complements or substitutes. An extension of the model is to allow changes in the class
of strategic environment. Our conjecture is that norms may not converge and generate
cycles. The same results should be found also when the strategic environment resembles
Prisoner Dilemma. In fact, according to our preliminary analysis, depending on the
24The only difference is to replace η with η′ = η +  for the majority and with η′′ = η −  for the minority.
Since the only condition relevant for the proofs is η < 1, the change does not affect the dynamics.
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material payoffs parametrization, the Prisoner Dilemma with norms becomes either a
game with strategic complements or a game with strategic substitutes.
This extension is particularly relevant to study more complex environments where
some the same norm is applied to both cooperative and competitive settings. Such an
extension could provide a foundation of the fact that if a society faces many tasks that
require a joint effort, then its agents develop more cooperative norms. This is also in
line with the recent empirical evidence suggesting that institutions, by changing material
payoffs, can lead to a crowding out of norms (Lowes et al., 2017).
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study a cultural transmission model where the relationship between
norms and strategic environments is made explicit. Agents divided into two communities
form their community norm by taking into account both the norm received by their previ-
ous generation and the average norm of the society. The relative strength of the two forces
is regulated by a horizontal socialization parameter. The norm received by the previous
generation depends on the average equilibrium actions played in the game under the hy-
pothesis of minimization of cognitive dissonance. We derive conditions under which norm
assimilation is reachable or not. Provided games material payoffs are randomly distributed
but preserve their strategic setting (complements/substitutes), the norm dynamics con-
verges to assimilation in environments with strategic complements and to polarization or
neutrality in environments with strategic substitutes. Moreover, when specific material
payoffs are chosen, provided initial conditions show enough heterogeneity, we are able
to obtain the rise of oppositional cultures and situations of cultural heterogeneity. For
example, we show that even if the material payoffs provides incentives to coordinate, it
is still possible to obtain integration but not assimilation or, even, polarization. At the
same time, in environments where material payoffs provide incentive to anti-coordinate,
it is still possible to reach assimilation or only partial polarization.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
In order to simplify the notation, we consider payoffs for a representative agent of each
community. The payoff of a generic agent belonging to community i ∈ I is
ui(x, θi, fi) = −fi
xi − (ηx1 + (1− η)x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Eη [x]

2
− (1− fi)(xi − θi)2.
Since each agent is negligible in the population, she does not affect the whole average.
Thus, the first order condition ∂ui(x,θi)∂xi = 0 gives
−2fi (xi − (ηx1 + (1− η)x2))− 2(1− fi)(xi − θi) = 0
fi (xi − (ηx1 + (1− η)x2)) + (1− fi)(xi − θi) = 0,
leading to
xi = fiEη[x] + (1− fi)θi. (11)
Taking expectations of (11) on both sides we get
Eη [x] = Eη [f · Eη[x] + (1− f)θ]
Eη [x] = Eη [f · Eη[x]] + Eη [θ]− Eη[f · θ]
Eη [x]− Eη [f ] · Eη[x] = Eη [θ]− Eη[f · θ]
Eη [x]− Eη [f ] · Eη[x] = Eη [θ]− Eη[f ] · Eη[θ]− covη[f, θ]
(1− Eη[f ]) · Eη [x] = (1− Eη[f ]) · Eη [θ]− cov[f, θ]
Eη [x] = Eη [θ]− covη[f, θ]
(1− Eη[f ]) .
Substituting Eη[x] in (11) we find the optimal action of each player belonging to commu-
nity i as a function of the distributions of θ and f
xi = fi
(
Eη [θ]− covη[f, θ]
(1− Eη[f ])
)
+ (1− fi)θi. (12)

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A.2 Proof of Corollary 1.1
From the ex-post norm formation rule (12) we obtain for agent i = 1
x1 = f1
(
ηθ1 + (1− η)θ2 − covη[f, θ]
1− f1η − f2(1− η)
)
+ (1− f1)θ1.
Computing the covariance leads to
covη[f, θ] = Eη [(f − Eη[f ])(θ − Eη[θ])]
= η(1− η)2(f1 − f2)(θ1 − θ2) + η2(1− η)(f2 − f1)(θ2 − θ1)
= η(1− η)(f1 − f2)(θ1 − θ2)
so that
x1 = f1
(
ηθ1 + (1− η)θ2 − η(1− η)(f1 − f2)(θ1 − θ2)
1− f1η − f2(1− η)
)
+ (1− f1)θ1
=
f1(1− η)(1− f2)
1− f1η − f2(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1−p1
θ2 +
(1− f1)(1− f2(1− η)
1− f1η − f2(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
p1
θ1.
The same can be computed for agent i = 2.

A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
We solve the generic game with norms as described in Table 1. The best-replies are
Aˆr(Ac = 1; b¯, d¯, xir) =
1 if xir > b¯0 if xir < b¯ and Aˆr(Ac = 0; b¯, d¯, xir) =
1 if xir > d¯0 if xir < d¯ .
Since the game is symmetric, these are also the best reply of agent c. Looking for the
fixed-point of the best replies we find the Nash Equilibria.

A.4 Corollary 2.1
Before we proceed with other proofs, we provide a partition of the norm space [0, 1]2 where
Nash equilibria are as described in Figure 1.
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Corollary 2.1 The regions of norms xir and xjc in which different Nash equilibria
emerge are the following:
R1∗,1∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xir > max{d¯, b¯} ∧ xjc > max{d¯, b¯}}
R0∗,0∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xir < min{d¯, b¯} ∧ xjc < min{d¯, b¯}}
R = {(xir , xjc) : min{d¯, b¯} < xir < max{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯}}
R1∗,0∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xir > max{d¯, b¯} ∧ xjc < min{d¯, b¯}}
R0∗,1∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xir < min{d¯, b¯} ∧ xjc > max{d¯, b¯}}
R1∗,1 = {(xir , xjc) : xir > max{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ d¯ > b¯}
R1∗,0 = {(xir , xjc) : xir > max{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ b¯ > d¯}
R1,1∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xjc > max{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xir < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ d¯ > b¯}
R0,1∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xjc > max{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xir < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ b¯ > d¯}
R0∗,0 = {(xir , xjc) : xir < min{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ d¯ > b¯}
R0∗,1 = {(xir , xjc) : xir < min{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ b¯ > d¯}
R0,0∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xir < min{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xjc < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ d¯ > b¯}
R1,0∗ = {(xir , xjc) : xjc < min{d¯, b¯} ∧min{d¯, b¯} < xir < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ b¯ > d¯}
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Substituting the dynamics of θ in equation (3) we getx1,t+1 = p1,t+1[(1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]] + (1− p1,t+1)[(1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t]]x2,t+1 = p2,t+1[(1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]] + (1− p2,t+1)[(1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t]] ,
where p1,t =
(1−f1,t)(1−f2,t(1−η))
1−f1,tη−f2,t(1−η) , p2,t =
f2,tη(1−f1,t)
1−f1,tη−f2,t(1−η) .
Substituting and computing the steady state we obtainx∗1 = φ∗1Eη,γ [A∗1] + (1− φ∗1)Eη,γ [A∗2]x∗2 = φ∗2Eη,γ [A∗1] + (1− φ∗2)Eη,γ [A∗2] , (13)
where φ∗1 =
p∗1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ)
1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ) and φ
∗
2 =
p∗2
1−(p∗1−p∗2)(1−λ) or, in terms of (f
∗
1 , f
∗
2 ),φ∗1 =
(1−f∗1 )f2η+λ(1−f∗1−f∗2 +f∗1 f∗2 )
f1(1−η)+f∗2 η−f∗1 f∗2 +λ(1−f∗1−f∗2 +f∗1 f∗2 )
φ∗2 =
f∗2 η(1−f1)
f1(1−η)+f∗2 η−f∗1 f∗2 +λ(1−f∗1−f∗2 +f∗1 f∗2 )
.

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A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
To verify that (1, 1), (0, 0), and
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
are steady states it is enough to substitute them
in (13). Due to the dynamics for horizontal socialization, namelyf1 = f¯(1− (1− η)|(Eη,γ [A1,t]− Eη,γ [A2,t])|)f2 = f¯(1− η|(Eη,γ [A2,t]− Eη,γ [A1,t]])|) , (14)
when norms, and thus average actions, are strong or neutral, Eη,γ [A1,t] = Eη,γ [A2,t] leading
to f∗1 = f∗2 = f¯ .
In order to study the dynamics and show that no other steady state is present, we
need to explicit Eη,γ [At] as a function of xt. Let’s first focus on the region {(x1,t, x2,t) :
x1,t >
1
2 , x2,t >
1
2}.
Assume x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (12 , 1), then
Eη,γ [A1,t] = γ(d¯ < x1,t) + γ(d¯ > x1,t ∧ d¯ < x2,t)
(
1− 1
2
η
)
+ γ(d¯ > x1,t ∧ d¯ > x2,t)1
2
Since payoffs are uniformly distributed in the region characterized by strategic comple-
mentarity
• γ(d¯ < x1) = 2
(
x1 − 12
)
• γ(d¯ > x1 ∧ d¯ < x2) = 4 (1− x1)
(
x2 − 12
)
• γ(d¯ > x1 ∧ d¯ > x2) = 4 (1− x1) (1− x2)
so that
Eη,γ [A1,t] = 2
(
x1,t − 1
2
)
+ 4 (1− x1,t)
(
x2,t − 1
2
)(
1− 1
2
η
)
+ 4 (1− x1,t) (1− x2,t) 1
2
.
= −1 + 2x1,t + 2x2,t − 2x1,tx2,t + (1− x1,t − 2x2,t + 2x1,tx2,t)η
A similar computation can be performed for Eη,γ [A2,t].
Next, we shall verify that if x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (12 , 1), then min{x1,t, x2,t} <
min{x1,t+1, x2,t+1} ≤ 1 for all t ∈ N. This is enough to prove that (1, 1) is the only steady
state in the region {(x1, x2) : x1 ∈ (12 , 1), x2 ∈ (12 , 1)} and that it is asymptotically stable
with basin of attraction at least as big as the region itself.
We first prove that Eη,γ [A1,t] > x1,t and Eη,γ [A2,t] > x2,t.
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Let us verify that Eη,γ [A1,t] > x1,t:
−1 + 2x1,t + 2x2,t − 2x1,tx2,t + (1− x1,t − 2x2,t + 2x1,tx2,t)η > x1,t
−1 + x1,t + 2x2,t − 2x1,tx2,t + (1− x1,t − 2x2,t + 2x1,tx2,t)η > 0
(x1,t − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− 2x2,t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
> 0, always satisfied.
By symmetry (the two groups have different sizes but it is enough to replace η with (1−η)
for the minority), we can repeat the reasoning for x2,t and show that Eη,γ [A2,t] > x2,t. In
particular, the expression for the average action is
Eη,γ [A2,t] = x2,t + (2x1,t − 1)(1− x2,t)η .
By eq. (3) both x1,t and x2,t are a convex combination of θ1,t and θ2,t. Moreover, if
Eη,γ [A1,t] > x1,t and Eη,γ [A2,t] > x2,t, then by eq. (5) both θ1,t > x1,t and θ2,t > x2,t.
Assume w.l.o.g. x1,t ≥ x2,t. Then, eqs. (3) and (5) imply x1,t+1 > x2,t and x2,t+1 >
x2,t, independently on the weights (p1,t, p2,t) of the convex combination in (3). More in
general, min{x1,t+1, x2,t+1} > min{x1,t, x2,t} for all t ∈ N. Moreover, by eqs. (3) and
(5) min{x1,t+1, x2,t+1} ≤ 1. Thus we can conclude that there are not steady states in
the region {(x1, x2) : x1 ∈ (12 , 1), x2 ∈ (12 , 1)} and that limt→∞min{x1,t, x2,t} = 1. The
latter together with the fact that norms are bounded above by 1 implies that (1, 1) is
asymptotically stable. The proof of the asymptotic stability of (0, 0), as well as the fact
that there are no steady states in {(x1,t, x2,t) : x1,t ∈
(
0, 12
)
, x2,t ∈
(
0, 12
)}, proceeds along
the same lines.
We now turn to the region of initial conditions {(x1,t, x2,t) : x1,t ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
, x2,t ∈
(
0, 12
)}
to show that it does not contain steady states, so that the dynamics either converges to(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
or moves in another region.
Assume x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (0, 12), then
Eη,γ [A1,t] = γ(d¯ < x1,t) + γ(d¯ > x1,t ∧ b¯ > x2,t)1
2
η + γ(d¯ > x1,t ∧ b¯ < x2,t)1
2
.
Since payoffs are uniformly distributed in the region characterized by strategic comple-
mentarity
• γ(d¯ < x1) = 2
(
x1 − 12
)
• γ(d¯ > x1 ∧ b¯ > x2) = 2(1− x1)(1− 2x2)
• γ(d¯ > x1 ∧ b¯ < x2) = 2(1− x1)2x2
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so that
Eη,γ [A1,t] = 2
(
x1,t − 1
2
)
+ 2(1− x1,t)(1− 2x2,t)1
2
η + 2(1− x1,t)2x2,t 1
2
= 2x1,t − 1 + η(1− x1,t)(1− 2x2,t) + 2(1− x1,t)x2,t.
Similarly, we can compute
Eη,γ [A2,t] = γ(d¯ < x1,t ∧ b¯ < x2,t)1
2
(1 + η) + (d¯ > x1,t ∧ b¯ < x2,t)1
2
γ
= 2(1 + η)
(
x1,t − 1
2
)
x2,t + 2(1− x1,t)x2,t.
We shall show below that for all norms {(x1,t, x2,t) : x1 ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)
, x2 ∈
(
0, 12
)} x2,t <
Eη,γ [A1,t] < x1,t and x2,t < Eη,γ [A2,t] < x1,t. Using equation (3), the former implies
x2,t < θ1,t+1 < x1,t while the latter implies x2,t < θ2,t+1 < x1,t. Equation (5) then implies
x1,t+1 < x1,t and x2,t+1 > x2,t, proving the result. (in what follows we remove the time
index to simplify the notation)
Let us verify that Eη,γ [A1] > x1:
2x1 − 1 + η(1− x1)(1− 2x2) + 2(1− x1)x2 > x1
x1 − 1 + η(1− x1)(1− 2x2) + 2(1− x1)x2 > 0
(1− x1)(−1 + η(1− 2x2) + 2x2) > 0
(1− x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(2x2 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
< 0, always satisfied.
Let us verify that Eη,γ [A2] > x2:
2(1 + η)
(
x1 − 1
2
)
x2 + 2(1− x1)x2 > x2(
2(1 + η)
(
x1 − 1
2
)
+ 2(1− x1)
)
x2 > x2
(+2ηx1 − η + 1)x2 > x2
(η (2x1 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1
x2 > x2, always satisfied.
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Let us verify that Eη,γ [A1] > x2
2x1 − 1 + η(1− x1)(1− 2x2) + 2(1− x1)x2 > x2
2x1 − 1 + η(1− x1)(1− 2x2) + 2(1− x1)x2 − x2 > 0
2x1 − 1 + (1− x1)(η(1− 2x2) + 2x2)− x2 > 0
2x1 − 1− x2 + (1− x1)(η + 2x2(1− η)) > 0, always satisfied.
Let us verify that Eη,γ [A2] < x1:
2(1 + η)
(
x1 − 1
2
)
x2 + 2(1− x1)x2 < x1
2x1x2 − x2 + 2ηx1x2 − ηx2 + 2x2 − 2x1x2 < x1
x2 + 2ηx1x2 − ηx2 < x1
x2(1− η + 2ηx1) < x1
x2 − x2η + 2ηx1x2 − x1 < 0
(x2 − x1) + x2η(2ηx1 − 1) < 0.
The left-hand side is maximized by η = 1. Thus, we should verify that
(x2 − x1) + x2(2x1 − 1) <0
2x1x2 − x1 <0
x1 (2x2 − 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
<0, always satisfied.
The proof that there are no steady states in {(x1,t, x2,t) : x1,t ∈
(
0, 12
)
, x2,t ∈
(
1
2 , 1
)}
proceeds along the same lines.
A.7 Proof of Proposition 5
To verify that (1, 1), (0, 0), and
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
are steady states one can proceed as in the proof
of Proposition 4. Before showing the existence of other fixed points, and assessing their
stability, we prove that (1, 1) and (0, 0) are unstable.
Let us consider the region x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (12 , 1). Assume x1,t > (12 , 1) and
x2,t > (
1
2 , 1), then
Eη,γ [A1,t] = γ(b¯ < x1,t) + γ(b¯ > x1,t ∧ b¯ < x2,t)1
2
η + γ(b¯ > x1,t ∧ b¯ > x2,t)1
2
.
Since payoffs are uniformly distributed in the region characterized by strategic substi-
tutability
38
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3407246 
• γ(b¯ < x1) = 2x1 − 1
• γ(b¯ > x1 ∧ d¯ < x2) = 4(1− x1)(x2 − 12)
• γ(b¯ > x1 ∧ b¯ > x2) = 4(1− x1)(1− x2)
so that
Eη,γ [A1,t] = (2x1,t − 1) + 4(1− x1,t)(x2,t − 1
2
)
1
2
η + 4(1− x1,t)(1− x2,t)1
2
.
By eq. (3) both x1,t and x2,t are convex combinations of θ1,t and θ2,t. The latter de-
pends directly on Eη,γ [A1,t] and Eη,γ [A2,t], respectively, as shown in eq. (5). In particular,
Eη,γ [A1] < x1 and Eη,γ [A2] < x2 are sufficient conditions to ensure that min{x1,t+1, x2,t+1} <
min{x1,t, x2,t}. By symmetry the opposite holds when x1,t ∈ (0, 12) and x2,t ∈ (0, 12). Thus,
(1, 1) and (0, 0) are unstable.
Let us verify that Eη,γ [A1] < x1:
2x1 − 1 + 2η(1− x1)
(
x2 − 1
2
)
+ 2(1− x1)(1− x2) < x1
x1 − 1 + 2η(1− x1)
(
x2 − 1
2
)
+ 2(1− x1)(1− x2) < 0
(1− x1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(1− 2x2)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1− η)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
< 0, always.
By symmetry Eη,γ [A2] < x2 and, as we have argued above, both x1,t and x2,t decrease.
We now turn to the existence of other fixed points and to their stability, as well as to
the stability of
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, by analyzing the norms dynamics in the region where x1,t ∈ (12 , 1)
and x2,t ∈ (0, 12) and, symmetrically, x1,t ∈ (0, 12) and x2,t ∈ (12 , 1).
Recall that the norm dynamics isx1,t+1 = p1,t+1[(1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]] + (1− p1,t+1)[(1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t]]x2,t+1 = p2,t+1[(1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]] + (1− p2,t+1)[(1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t]] ,
where p1,t =
(1−f1,t)(1−f2,t(1−η))
1−f1,tη−f2,t(1−η) , p2,t =
f2,tη(1−f1,t)
1−f1,tη−f2,t(1−η) , and from (7)f1,t+1 = f¯(1− (1− η)|(Eη,γ [A1,t]− Eη,γ [A2,t])|)f2,t+1 = f¯(1− η|(Eη,γ [A2,t]− Eη,γ [A1,t]])|) .
When η = 12 , f1,t+1 = f2,t+1 so that p1,t+1 = 1− 12f1,t+1 and p2,t+1 = 1− p1,t+1 = 12f1,t+1.
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The norm dynamics simplifies tox1,t+1 = (1− 12f1,t+1)((1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]) + 12f1,t+1((1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t])x2,t+1 = 12f1,t+1((1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]) + (1− 12f1,t+1)((1− λ)x2,t + λEη,γ [A2,t])
(15)
and, adding up the two equations,
x1,t+1 + x2,t+1 = (1− λ)(x1,t + x2,t) + λ(Eη,γ [A1,t]] + λEη,γ [A2,t]]). (16)
Next we shall show that if x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (0, 12), or x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (0, 12),
the term Eη,γ [A1,t]] + λEη,γ [A2,t] depends only on the sum zt = x1,t + x2,t, so that (16)
can be used to characterize the dynamics of zt.
Let us start from the region where x1,t ∈ (12 , 1) and x2,t ∈ (0, 12). For Eη,γ [A1,t] we
have
Eη,γ [A1,t] = γ(b¯ < x1,t) + γ(b¯ > x1,t ∧ d¯ > x2,t)(1− 1
4
) + γ(b¯ > x1,t ∧ d¯ < x2,t)1
2
.
Since payoffs are uniformly distributed in the region characterized by strategic substi-
tutability
• γ(b¯ < x1) = 2x1 − 1
• γ(b¯ > x1 ∧ d¯ > x2) = 4(1− x1)(12 − x2)
• γ(b¯ > x1 ∧ d¯ < x2) = 4(1− x1)x2
then
Eη,γ [A1,t] = 2x1,t − 1 + 3
2
(1− x1,t)(1− 2x2,t) + 2(1− x1,t)x2,t
=
1
2
− x2,t + x1,t(1
2
+ x2,t)
Turning to Eη,γ [A2,t], we have
Eη,γ [A2,t] = γ(b¯ < x1,t ∧ d¯ < x2,t)1
4
+ γ(b¯ > x1,t ∧ d¯ < x2,t)1
2
so that, computing the probabilities of having norms within the given bounds,
Eη,γ [A2,t] = 4
(
x1,t − 1
2
)
x2
1
4
+ 4(1− x1,t)x2,t 1
2
=
(
3
2
− x1,t
)
x2,t.
Importantly
Eη,γ [A1,t] + Eη,γ [A2,t] =
1
2
(1 + x1,t + x2,t) .
40
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3407246 
Swapping the role of x1,t and x2,t, we get the values of Eη,γ [A1,t] and Eη,γ [A2,t], and their
sum, also in the region where x1,t ∈ (0, 12) and x2,t ∈ (12 , 1).
Using the sum of average payoffs in (16), we obtain the dynamics for zt = x1,t + x2,t:
zt+1 = (1− λ)zt + λ
2
(1 + zt) =
(
1− λ
2
)
zt +
λ
2
(17)
The latter has a unique, and globally stable, steady state z∗ = 1, implying that we can
restrict the stability analysis of the norm dynamics on the line x1 + x2 = 1.
We turn to the analysis of the norm dynamics on the line x1 + x2 = 1. Without loss
of generality we also impose x1 ∈ (12 , 1). From the norms dynamics in (??) we obtain
x1,t+1 = (1− 1
2
f1,t+1)[(1− λ)x1,t + λEη,γ [A1,t]] + 1
2
f1,t+1[(1− λ)(1− x1,t) + λEη,γ [A2,t]]
where 
f1,t+1 = f¯(1− 12 |(Eη,γ [A1,t]− Eη,γ [A2,t])|)
Eη,γ [A1,t] = 52x1,t − 12 − x21,t
Eη,γ [A2,t] =
(
3
2 − x1,t
)
(1− x1,t).
Substituting and simplifying we obtain
x1,t+1 =
1
2
+
(
x1,t − 1
2
)
(1 + λ− λx1,t)
(
1− f¯
(
1− (2− x)
(
x− 1
2
)))
or, defining yt = xt+1 − 12 ,
yt+1 = yt
(
1 + λ
(
1
2
− yt
))(
1− f¯ + f¯yt
(
3
2
− yt
))
= f(yt) = yth(yt). (18)
The dynamics of yt has y
∗ = 0 as steady state, whose stability can be assessed by looking
at
f ′(y)
∣∣
y=0
= (h(y) + yh′(y))
∣∣
y=0
= h(0) =
(
1 +
λ
2
)(
1− f¯) .
Imposing f ′(0) < 1, we derive that the steady state y∗ = 0, and thus (x∗1, x∗2) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, is
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asymptotically stable when25
f¯ >
λ
2 + λ
.
Note that instead
f¯ <
λ
2 + λ
(19)
implies that y∗ = 0, and thus (x∗1, x∗2) =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, is unstable. The existence of other steady
states and their stability depends on whether there exists y∗ ∈ (0, 12) such that
f(y∗) = 0⇔ h(y∗) = 1 and |f ′(y∗)| < 1⇔ |h(y∗)− y∗h′(y∗)| < 1 .
Expliciting h(y) from (18) we obtain the following third degree polynomial
h(y) = f¯λy3 − 3
2
f¯
(
1 +
3
2
λ
)
y2 +
(
3
2
f¯ +
7
4
f¯λ− λ
)
y +
(
1 +
λ
2
)
(1− f¯). (20)
We shall use the properties of the function h and of its derivative h′ in the interval
[
0, 12
]
to verify the presence of asymptotically stable fixed point. Having
lim
y→±∞h(y) = ±∞ and h
(
1
2
)
< 0
implies that there exists at most two solutions of h(y) = 0 in the interval
[
0, 12
]
. We shall
show that the exact number of solutions (steady states), and their stability, depends on
the relative strength of λ and f¯ .
Let us consider first the case f¯ < λ2+λ , so that y
∗ = 0 in unstable, as we derived in
25Alternatively one could derive the Jacobian of (15) in
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
. Irrespectively from the region where average
actions are computed the result is
J
(
1
2
,
1
2
)
=
[
1− f¯ ( 12 + 14λ) f¯ ( 12 + 14λ)− 12λ
f¯
(
1
2 +
1
4λ
)− 12λ 1− f¯ ( 12 + 14λ)
]
.
Calling µ1 and µ2 the eigenvalues of J(xt) we get
µ1 = 1− f¯
(
1
2
+
1
4
λ
)
− 0.25
√
f¯2(2 + λ)2 − f¯(8 + 4λ)λ+ 4λ2
µ2 = 1− f¯
(
1
2
+
1
4
λ
)
+ 0.25
√
f¯2(2 + λ)2 − f¯(8 + 4λ)λ+ 4λ2
While µ1 < 1 is always true, for µ2 < 1 we should verify that
−f¯
(
1
2
+
1
4
λ
)
+ 0.25
√
f¯2(2 + λ)2 − f¯(8 + 4λ)λ+ 4λ2 < 0,
which is true when
λ <
2f¯
1− f¯ ⇔ f¯ >
λ
2 + λ
.
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(19). It can be verified that
h(0) > 1,
implying that there exists one and only solution

y of h(y) = 0 in the interval
[
0, 12
]
. The
fact that such a fixed point is globally stable is implied by y∗ = 0 being unstable and
by the fact that f ′(y) > −1 for all y ∈ [0, 12] (the latter is implied by f ′′′(y) < 0 and
f ′
(
1
2
)
> −1), so that f ′(y) ∈ (−1, 1). We have shown that for f¯ < λ2+λ the norm dynamics
converges to a (

x1,

x2) ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]× [0, 12] for all initial conditions in [12 , 1]× [0, 12].
Let us now turn to the case f¯ = λ2+λ . Here, h(0) = 1. If λ >
2
3 also h
′(0) > 0 so that
there exists two steady states, y∗ = 0 and y ∈ (0, 12), of which only the latter is stable
(because f ′(0) = 0 and f ′(y) > −1 for all y ∈ [0, 12]). Lower values of λ, holding fixed
f¯ = λ2+λ , imply instead h
′(0) ≤ 0 so that the only steady state is y∗ = 0 and it is globally
stable.
We turn now to f¯ > λ2+λ , implying that y
∗ = 0 is asymptotically stable. Here,
h(0) < 1. If f¯ is close to λ2+λ and λ high enough, there exist two solutions of h(y) = 1 in
the interval
(
0, 12
)
. Of these solutions the largest,

y, is asymptotically stable. The norm
dynamics has thus two locally stable fixed points
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
and (

x1,

x2) ∈
[
1
2 , 1
] × [0, 12].
Increasing f¯ above a threshold fˆ , threshold that depends on λ, implies instead that there
are no solutions of h(y) = 1 (both (h(0) − 1) and h′(0) become rather negative) so that
y∗ = 0, corresponding to the norms
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
, is the only, globally stable, fixed point.
By symmetry we can repeat the reasoning when x1,t ∈
[
0, 12
]
and x2,t ∈
[
1
2 , 1
]
and
find: converging to (
◦
x1,
◦
x2) for low f¯ ; convergence to
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
for high f¯ ; and convergence
to either steady state, depending on the initial conditions, for intermediate f¯ . Since the
dynamics is symmetric to the one found above the threshold f¯ is the same.

A.8 Proofs of Section 3.2
Before we discuss the possible steady states in both complement and substitute environ-
ments for a singular payoff distribution, we provide a general convergence result. The next
proposition ensures the for all parameters and every initial conditions, the norm dynamics
converges and, moreover, all steady states that exist are asymptotically stable. Thus, we
can partition the whole state space of norms in basins of attraction.
Proposition 6 For all η ∈ (0, 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1), and (b¯, d¯) ∈ [0, 1] × [0, 1], if all
material payoffs are determined by (b¯, d¯), then all steady states are asymptotically stable
and their basins of attraction form a partition of the state space of norms and socialization
levels.
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Proof
First note that the dynamics of f in (7) depends on norms through average payoffs.
Moreover, when all players face the same game, average payoffs are constant for norms in
the regions identified by Corollary 2.1. Thus, horizontal socializations f are constant in
each region identified by Corollary 2.1, and equal to f∗, and we can concentrate on the
dynamics of norms. For f∗ given, the dynamics of norms in (9) becomes
xt+1 = υ(ζ(xt,f
∗), ψ(f∗)).
or, expliciting the functions υ and ζ,
xt = (1− λ)
p1,t(f∗) 1− p1,t(f∗)
p2,t(f
∗) 1− p2,t(f∗)
xt−1 + constant,
where the constant depends on average payoffs and f∗ and the expression of p1,t and p2,t
is in Corollary 1.1.
The norm dynamics within each region of the state space depends linearly on previous
norms through a stochastic matrix, whose composition is also stochastic. We can thus
solve the norm dynamics and get
xt − x∗ = (1− λ)tP(t)(x0 − x∗),
where P(t) is a stochastic matrix and x∗ is a steady states. Taking the limit, and assuming
that the steady state x∗ is in the region considered, we have convergence for all x0 within
the same region (and possibly outside from it if there are no steady state in other regions)
Below, we characterize all the possible steady states of (9) and their possible basin of
attraction.

A.9 Point Distribution: Steady States
In this section, we discuss all the possible steady state with point distribution.
We define e as a generic element of E , thus we can enumerate the possible steady states
as e1, e2, ...
Proposition 7 [Assimilation and Norm Neutrality]
Consider the norm and socialization level dynamics in (9). For all η ∈ (0, 1), b¯ ∈ (0, 1),
d¯ ∈ (0, 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1)
• e1 = (1, 1) and e2 = (0, 0) ∈ E. In both steady states the socialization level is f∗ =
(f¯ , f¯) and the average actions are, respectively, Eη[A∗] = (1, 1) and Eη[A∗] = (0, 0),
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• e3 = (12 , 12) ∈ E if and only if the original 2× 2 symmetric game has multiple Nash
equilibria. At the steady state the socialization level is f∗ = (f¯ , f¯) and the average
action is Eη[A∗] =
(
1
2 ,
1
2
)
Proposition 8 [Polarization]
Consider the norm and socialization level dynamics in (9). For all η ∈ (0, 1), b¯ ∈ (0, 1),
d¯ ∈ (0, 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1)
• e4 = (φ1, φ2, f¯η, f¯(1− η)) ∈ E if and only if φ1 > max{d¯, b¯} ∧ φ2 < min{d¯, b¯}. The
average actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] = (1, 0).
• e5 = (1− φ1, 1− φ2, f¯η, f¯(1− η)) ∈ E if and only if 1− φ1 < max{d¯, b¯} ∧ 1− φ2 >
min{d¯, b¯}. The average actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] = (0, 1).
Proposition 9 [Integration Without Assimilation]
Consider the norm and socialization level dynamics in (9). For all η ∈ (0, 1), b¯ ∈ (0, 1),
d¯ ∈ (0, 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1), with b¯ < d¯
• e6
d¯
=
(
1− 12(1− η)(1− φ1), 1− 12(1− φ2)(1− η), f¯
(
1− 12(1− η)2
)
, f¯
(
1− 12η(1− η)
))
∈ E if and only if 1 − 12(1 − φ2)(1 − η) < d¯ < 1 − 12(1 − η(1 − φ1)). The average
actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] =
(
1, 12(1 + η)
)
.
• e7
d¯
=
(
1− 12ηφ1, 1− 12ηφ2, f¯
(
1− 12η(1− η)
)
, f¯
(
1− 12η2
)) ∈ E if and only if 1 −
1
2ηφ1 < d¯ < 1 − 12ηφ2. The average actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] =(
1− 12η, 1
)
.
• e8
d¯
=
(
1
2ηφ1,
1
2ηφ2, f¯
(
1− 12η(1− η)
)
, f¯
(
1− 12η2
)) ∈ E if and only if 12ηφ2 < b¯ <
1
2ηφ1. The average actions at the steady state are Eη[A
∗] =
(
1
2η, 0
)
.
• e9
d¯
=
(
1
2(1− η)(1− φ1), 12(1− η)(1− φ2), f¯
(
1− 12(1− η)2
)
, f¯
(
1− 12η(1− η)
)) ∈ E
if and only if 12(1 − η)(1 − φ1) < b¯ < 12(1 − η)(1 − φ2). The actions at the steady
state are Eη[A∗] =
(
0, 12(1− η)
)
.
Proposition 10 [Partial Polarization]
Consider the norm and socialization level dynamics in (9). For all η ∈ (0, 1), b¯ ∈ (0, 1),
d¯ ∈ (0, 1), f¯ ∈ (0, 1), λ ∈ (0, 1), with d¯ < b¯
• e6
b¯
=
(
1− 12(1− φ1)(1 + η), 1− 12(1− φ2)(1 + η), f¯(12(1 + η2)), f¯(1− 12η(1 + η))
) ∈
E if and only if b¯ < 1 − 12(1 − φ1)(1 + η) ∧ d¯ < 1 − 12(1 − φ2)(1 + η). The average
actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] =
(
1, 12(1− η)
)
.
• e7
b¯
=
(
1− φ1(1− 12η), 1− φ2(1− 12η), f¯(1− 12η(1− η)), f¯(12η(3− η))
) ∈ E if and
only if d¯ < 1 − φ1(1 − 12η) ∧ b¯ < 1 − φ2(1 − 12η). The average actions at the
steady state are Eη[A∗] =
(
1
2η, 1
)
.
• e8
b¯
=
(
φ1(1− 12η), φ2(1− 12η), f¯(1− 12η(1− η)), f¯(12η(3− η))
) ∈ E if and only if
φ2(1 − 12η) < d¯ < φ1(1 − 12η) ∧ b¯ > φ1(1 − 12η). The average actions at the steady
state are Eη[A∗] =
(
1− 12η, 0
)
.
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• e9
b¯
=
(
1
2(1 + η)(1− φ1), 12(1 + η)(1− φ2), f¯(12(1 + η2)), f¯(1− 12η(1 + η))
) ∈ E if and
only if 12(1 + η)(1− φ1) < d¯ < 12(1 + η)(1− φ2) ∧ b¯ > 12(1 + η)(1− φ2). The average
actions at the steady state are Eη[A∗] =
(
0, 12(1 + η)
)
.
Corollary 10.1 The steady state described in Proposition 7, 8, 9, and 10 are the only
possible steady states of (9). Moreover
• If the game has strategic complements, b¯ < 12 < d¯, (9) has a minimum of three steady
states, (e1, e2, e3), and a maximum of nine, (e1, ..., e9
d¯
).
• If the game has strategic substitutes, b¯ < 12 < d¯, (9) has a minimum of three steady
states, (e1, e2, e3), and a maximum of nine, (e1, ..., e9
b¯
).
Proofs of Propositions 7-10 and Corollary 10.1
If the distribution γ is singular, then Eη,γ [A] = Eη[A]. In order to prove the previous
propositions we need to substitute Eη[A] in equation (9). Having constant payoffs when
norms are within specific bound given by b¯ and d¯ and a linear dynamics of norms due to
cognitive dissonance, (5), proves convergence and leads to the following basins of attrac-
tion B(e1), B(e2), ... defined as a function of norms regions in Corollary 2.1.
1. B(e1)

3 R1∗,1∗ always
3 R1∗,1 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e6d¯ ∈ R1∗,1∗
3 R1,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e6d¯ ∈ R1∗,1∗
3 R1∗,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R1∗,1 ∧ e6d¯ ∈ R1∗,1∗
3 R0∗,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R1,1∗ ∧ e6d¯ ∈ R1∗,1∗
2. B(e2)

3 R iff e2 ∈ R
3 R1∗,0∗ iff e4 ∈ R
3 R0∗,1∗ iff e5 ∈ R
3 R1∗,1 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e6d¯ ∈ R
3 R1,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e7d¯ ∈ R
3 R0,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e8d¯ ∈ R
3 R0∗,0 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e9d¯ ∈ R
3 R1∗,0 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e6b¯ ∈ R
3 R0,1∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e7b¯ ∈ R
3 R1,0∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e8b¯ ∈ R
3 R0∗,1 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e9b¯ ∈ R
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3. B(e3)

3 R0∗,0∗ always
3 R0,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e8d¯ ∈ R0∗,0∗
3 R0∗,0 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e9d¯ ∈ R0∗,0∗
3 R1∗,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R0,0∗ ∧ e8d¯ ∈ R0∗,0∗
3 R0∗,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R0∗,0 ∧ e9d¯ ∈ R0∗,0∗
4. B(e4)

3 R1∗,0∗ iff e4 ∈ E
3 R1∗,0 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e6b¯ ∈ R1∗,0∗
3 R1,0∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e8b¯ ∈ R1∗,0∗
5. B(e5)

3 R0∗,1∗ iff e5 ∈ E
3 R0,1∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e7b¯ ∈ R0∗,1∗
3 R0∗,1 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e9b¯ ∈ R0∗,1∗
6. B(e6
d¯
)
3 R1∗,1 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e6d¯ ∈ E3 R1∗,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R1∗,1
7. B(e7
d¯
)
3 R1,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e7d¯ ∈ E3 R0∗,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R1,1∗
8. B(e8
d¯
)
3 R0,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e8d¯ ∈ E3 R1∗,0∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R0,0∗
9. B(e9
d¯
)
3 R0∗,0 iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e9d¯ ∈ E3 R0∗,1∗ iff d¯ > b¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R0∗,0
10. B(e6
b¯
)
3 R1∗,0 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e6b¯ ∈ E3 R1∗,0∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R1∗,0
11. B(e7
b¯
)
3 R0,1∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e7b¯ ∈ E3 R0∗,1∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R0,1∗
12. B(e8
b¯
)
3 R1,0∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e8b¯ ∈ E3 R1∗,0∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e4 ∈ R1,0∗
13. B(e9
b¯
)
3 R0∗,1 iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e9b¯ ∈ E3 R0∗,1∗ iff b¯ > d¯ ∧ e5 ∈ R0∗,1
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Considering all the possible steady states and basins of attraction and we can easily check
that ⋃
∀ei∈E
B(ei) = [0, 1]2 × [0, 1]2
Thus, independently on parameters b¯, d¯, η, λ, f¯ the dynamics (9) converges to a stable
steady state for all initial norms x0.

B Microfoundation of Parental Transmission
B.1 Flexibility Parameter Optimal Choice
In this section we shall show that the vector of flexibility parameters f = (f1,t, f2,t) can
arise as the equilibrium of the game played by parents of groups i = 1, 2 who face the
following optimization problem (see e.g. Panebianco, 2014)
max
1−fi,t∈[0,1]
{
−(θi,t − xi,t)2 − 1
2
(1− fi,t)2
}
. (21)
Before we proceed, it is necessary to adapt the concept of cultural substitution to our
framework. According to Bisin and Verdier (2001) there is cultural substitution whenever
“parents have fewer incentives to socialize their children the more widely dominant are
their values in the population”. In our model the cultural traits are continuous and the
communities are fixed, moreover, according to (5) the transmitted norm for the community
i, θi,t, depends on the average action played. For his reason we are interested in re-define
the concept of cultural substitution (complementarity) with respect the difference between
the actions of community i and those of the whole society.
To be consistent with the standard literature about cultural transmission, we have
written the maximization problem (21) with respect the direct (vertical) socialization
effort 1 − fi,t. Since we are interested in the horizontal socialization, we study cultural
substitution (complementarity) with respect fi,t.
Recall that the average action in the whole society is
A¯t = ηEη,γ [A1,t] + (1− η)Eη,γ [A2,t].
Definition 1 fi,t satisfies the cultural substitution (complementarity) property if, for all
parameter values, is a continuous, strictly decreasing (increasing) function with respect
|Eη,γ [Ai,t]− A¯t|
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We define cultural substitution (complementarity) with respect the average actions and
not with respect population shares η and 1−η. This distinction is important and it is due
to the fact that in our framework population shares are fixed, while norms and actions
evolve over time. Moreover agents belonging to different ex-ante community may end up
to have the same norm and play the same action.
We further assume that parents are able to anticipate the offsprings’ future choices in
the young age, (3), buy that are not able to anticipate their payoffs in the adult age.
Proposition 11
Given the parents problem (21), there exists an fi,t that satisfies the cultural substitution
property.
Proof of Proposition 11
First we change variable and set τi,t = 1− fi,t so that (21) becomes
max
τi,t∈[0,1]
{
−(θi,t − xi,t)2 − 1
2
τ2i,t
}
.
Parents are aware that
xi,t = pi(τt)θi,t + (1− pi(τt))θ−i,t.
Thus they solve
max
τi,t∈[0,1]
{
−(θi,t − pi(τt)θi,t − (1− pi(τt))θ−i,t)2 − 1
2
τ2i,t
}
,
max
τi,t∈[0,1]
{
−(1− pi(τt))2(θi,t − θ−i,t)2 − 1
2
τ2i,t
}
.
Solving the first order condition
∂U
∂τi,t
= 0 : 2
∂pi(θt)
∂τi,t
(1− pi(θt))(θi,t − θ−i,t)2 − τi,t = 0
where
pi(τt) =
τi,t(1− (1− τ−i,t)(1− η))
1− τi,tη − (1− τ−i,t)(1− η) =
τi,t(η + τ−i,t(1− η))
τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η) ,
∂pi(θt)
∂τi,t
=
τ−i,t(1− η)(η + τ−i,t(1− η)))
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))2 ,
1− pi(τt) = (1− τi,t)(1− η)τ−i,t
τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η) .
The latter imply
2
τ2−i,t(1− τ−i,t)(1− η)2(η + τ−i,t(1− η)))
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))3 (θi,t − θ−i,t)
2 − τi,t = 0. (22)
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(from (22) it is also evident that ∂
2U
∂τ2i
< 0, so that the second order condition is satisfied).
Next, we check the number of solutions of (22) or, equivalently, the solutions of
τi,t = 2(θi,t − θ−i,t)2τ2−i,t(1− η)2(η + τ−i,t(1− η))
(1− τi,t)
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))3 (23)
On the left hand side of (23) we have a linear function while on the right hand side we
have a decreasing function (this is evident by computing the derivative of the r.h.s. with
respect to τi,t). Thus for each τ−i,t there exists only one real and positive best reply τi,t.
Since we have the two best reply functions (one for each group of parents) we can use the
Brouwer’s fixed point theorem to ensure that the game where parents solve (21) admits
at least an equilibrium in the space [0, 1].
If τ−i,t = 0, then τi,t = 0 implying that (0, 0) is always a solution of (23). Next we
shall prove that also an interior equilibrium exists. Sufficient conditions are that τi,t < 1
when τ−i,t = 1 for both i = 1, 2 and that best replies in zero have first derivative higher
than 1.
We first show that if τ−i,t = 1, then τi,t < 1. Substituting τ−i,t = 1 in (23) we obtain
τi,t = 2 · (θi,t − θ−i,t)2 · (1− η)2(η + (1− η)) · (1− τi,t)
(τi,tη + (1− η))3 .
whose solution in τi,t can only be in the interval (0, 1).
Next we use implicit function theorem on (22), which defines the function F , to show
that best replies in zero are increasing with first derivative higher than 1. We obtain
τ ′i,t(τ−i,t) = −
F ′τ−i,t
F ′τi,t
,
F ′τ−i,t =
(1− η)2ητ−i,t(1− τi,t)((1− η)τ−i,t(3τi,t − 1) + 2ητi,t)
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))4 (θi,t − θ−i,t)
2,
F ′τi,t = −
(1− η)2τ2−i,t(η(τ−i,t − 1)− τ−i,t)(η(τ−i,t − 2τi,t − 3)− τ−i,t)
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))4 (θi,t − θ−i,t)
2 − 1.
Defining ∆θt = θi,t − θ−i,t
τ
′
i,t(τ−i,t) =
(1 − η)2ητ−i,t(1 − τi,t)((1 − η)τ−i,t(3τi,t − 1) + 2ητi,t)∆θ2t
(1 − η)2τ2−i,t(η(τ−i,t − 1) − τ−i,t)(η(τ−i,t − 2τi,t − 3) − τ−i,t)∆θ2t − (τi,tη + τ−i,t(1 − η))4
. (24)
Although we cannot use implicit function theorem in the point τ−i,t = 0, we can study
τ ′i,t(τ−i,t) when τ−i,t → 0.
From (23), τi,t is the solution of a quartic equation, thus τi,t = o(τ
α
−i,t). Therefore
τ
′
i,t(τ−i,t) =
(1 − η)2ητ−i,t(1 − o(τα−i,t))((1 − η)τ−i,t(3o(τα−i,t) − 1) + 2ηo(τα−i,t))∆θ2t
(1 − η)2τ2−i,t(η(τ−i,t − 1) − τ−i,t)(η(τ−i,t − 2o(τα−i,t) − 3) − τ−i,t)∆θ2t − (o(τα−i,t)η + τ−i,t(1 − η))4
(25)
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lim
τ−i,t→0
τ ′i,t(τ−i,t) = lim
τ−i,t→0
τ−i,t(τ−i,t + τα−i,t)
τ3−i,t(−τ−i,t − τα−i,t)− τ4α−i,t − τ4−i,t
In studying limτ−i,t τ
′
i,t(τ−i,t) we have to consider, both at the numerator and the denom-
inator, only the smallest power of τ−i,t, thus we have to distinguish different cases.
• If α > 1 then
lim
τ−i,t→0
−τ2−i,t
−τ4−i,t
= +∞,
which is not possible, since it is not consistent with τi,t = o(τ
α
−i,t).
• If 0 < α < 1 then
lim
τ−i,t→0
−τ1+α−i,t
−τ4α−i,t
= +∞ if α > 1
3
,
so that α > 13 is not consistent with τi,t = o(τ
α
−i,t).
We can conclude that it must be 13 < α < 1. Both the numerator and the denominator of
(25) go to zero when τ−i,t → 0 and, since the denominator is a polynomial of higher order
in τ−i,t, the slope of the best-reply function is unbounded (from above) in a sufficiently
small neighborhood of zero.
We conclude the proof by showing that that best replies positively depend on |Eη,γ [Ai,t−1]−
Eη,γ [A−i,t−1]|. This is sufficient to show that the socialization problem satisfy the cultural
substitutions properties.
Defining ∆Eη,γ [At−1] = Eη,γ [Ai,t−1] − Eη,γ [A−i,t−1] and substituting equation (5) we
get
τi,t = 2((1−λ)(xi,t−1−x−i,t−1)+λ∆Eη,γ [At−1])2τ2−i,t(1−η)2(η+τ−i,t(1−η)))
(1− τi,t)
(τi,tη + τ−i,t(1− η))3
τi,t positively depend on Eη,γ [Ai,t−1]−Eη,γ [A−i,t−1]. Since |Eη,γ [Ai,t]−A¯t| is equivalent
to |(Eη,γ [Ai,t−1] − Eη,γ [A−i,t−1])(1 − η)|, then τi,t positively depends on |Eη,γ [Ai,t] − A¯t|.
We also know that fi,t = 1− τi,t. Therefore, given the parents problem (21), fi,t satisfies
the cultural substitution property. The qualitative result on socialization level of our rule
(7) is equivalent to the one derived in a rational transmission model that stems from
preference for offspring with similar cultural traits.
In Figure 7, we show the change of best replies, and thus of the interior equilibrium, after
a change of |Eη,γ [Ai,t] − A¯t| for both i = 1, 2. In particular, if |Eη,γ [Ai,t] − A¯t| decreases
also the equilibrium vertical socialization decreases. Although we represent the case with
only one interior equilibrium, the same applies with more equilibria if one selects the
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Figure 7: Change of best replies of the Parental Transmission Game, and of the related Nash Equi-
librium, after a decrease in average payoffs difference.
equilibrium with max or min value of vertical socialization.

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